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CONFLICT OF LAWS
by
James Paul George* and Fred C. Pedersen**
ONFLICTS of law occur when foreign elements appear in a lawsuit.
Nonresident plaintiffs or defendants, incidents in other state or coun-
tries, and lawsuits outside of Texas are all foreign elements that may
create conflicts problems with judicial jurisdiction, choice of law, or the rec-
ognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. This Article will review
Texas conflicts of law during the Survey period from late 1984 through 1985.
The Survey includes cases from Texas state and federal courts, and non-
Texas cases affecting Texas practice.
During the Survey period, judicial jurisdiction continued its uncertain the-
oretical expansion, with Texas courts raising important questions. Foreign
judgments law had a more orderly development as the courts applied the
uniform foreign judgments acts, now recodified in the new Texas Civil Prac-
tice and Remedies Code.' Choice of law had no fundamental changes, but
some Texas courts groped with the application of the most significant rela-
tionship test from the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.2
I. JUDICIAL JURISDICTION
During the Survey period a number of Texas state and federal cases shed
light on various areas of judicial jurisdiction, including long-arm jurisdiction
(particularly the definition of doing business in Texas), notice, service of pro-
cess, divorce and child custody jurisdiction, and sovereign immunity.
Equally important is the 1985 recodification of Texas long-arm law in the
new Civil Practice and Remedies Code, although the expressed legislative
intent is to recodify only and not to make substantive changes.3
A. Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents
1. Long-Arm Jurisdiction in State Courts. Long-arm jurisdiction, the fo-
rum state's authority to compel nonresidents to appear in court, is the fore-
most component of judicial jurisdiction for conflict of laws purposes. Two
* B.A., Oklahoma State University; J.D., University of Tulsa; LL.M., Columbia Uni-
versity. Attorney at Law, North Central Texas Legal Services; Adjunct Instructor of Conflict
of Laws, Southern Methodist University School of Law.
** B.A., State University of New York College at Oswego; J.D., University of Toledo;
LL.M., Columbia University. Attorney at Law, Hughes and Luce, Dallas, Texas.
1. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. (Vernon Pam 1986).
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971).
3. Act of June 16, 1985, ch. 959, § 10, 1985 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 7043 (Vernon).
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standards govern long-arm jurisdiction: the forum's long-arm statute and
the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. 4 The princi-
pal Texas long-arm statute is article 203 lb, now Chapter 17 of the new Civil
Practice and Remedies Code.5
Most prominent among this year's long-arm law developments were two
state appellate cases. Both dealt with the definition of doing business in
Texas for purposes of long-arm jurisdiction. 6 Moreover, both based their
analyses on the distinction between general and specific jurisdiction as set
forth in the recent and notable Helicol decision.7
Middleton v. Kawasaki Steel Corporation8 (Kawasaki 1) began as a collec-
tion action by Oilworld Supply Company against Middleton, a west Texas
oil and gas driller, for payment on Middleton's 1979 purchase of pipe cas-
ings. Middleton bought the steel pipe casing directly from Oilworld, which
had ordered the casing from the Japanese manufacturer, Kawasaki Steel,
through the distributor, Japan Cotton Company. Middleton counterclaimed
against Oilworld's collection action and added a third-party claim against
Japan Cotton and Kawasaki Steel. The counterclaim alleged that the steel
casing had separated during insertion in the gas well, requiring the well to be
plugged back at the shallower, less productive zone.
The trial court dismissed Middleton's counterclaim against Kawasaki be-
cause of lack of personal jurisdiction.9 The trial court found that Kawasaki
Steel, the parent company in Japan, had a Houston office from 1975 to April
1981 for market research and information gathering, and not for soliciting
Texas sales. The court further found that at no time had Kawasaki Steel
initiated a process from its Houston office by which it sold its products in
Texas. Thus the trial court concluded that Kawasaki Steel had done nothing
4. The fifth amendment due process clause imposes limits on the personal jurisdiction of
federal district courts in federal question cases with federal service of process. U.S. CONST.
amend. V. The fourteenth amendment due process clause applies to state and federal courts in
all other cases. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
5. As of September 1, 1985, article 2031b is now in sections 17.042-.045 of the new Texas
Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Texas also has specific subject matter long-arm statutes,
some of which are affected by the new Code. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 17.092 (Vernon Pam. 1986) (former article 2033a) (service on the local representative of
nonresident individuals or partnerships supplying public utility services); id. § 17.021 (former
articles 2033b, 2033c) (service of process on an agent or clerk in county other than the princi-
pal's residence, where principal includes individual, partnership, or unincorporated associa-
tion, and also encompasses nonresidents of Texas; also, detailing the effect of service); TEX.
Bus. CORP. ACT. ANN. art. 8.10 (Vernon 1980) (service of process on foreign corporations);
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.26 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (acquiring jurisdiction over nonresident
respondents in divorce actions); Id. § 11.051 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1986) (acquiring jurisdiction
over nonresident respondents in child custody actions). The procedure for serving nonresi-
dents is set out in TEX. R. Civ. P. 108 (nonresidents in the United States) and id. 108a (non-
residents in foreign countries).
6. Cf note 29 infra, explaining that the real issue in Beechem v. Pippin, 686 S.W.2d 356
(Tex. App.-Austin 1985, no writ) was not to further define "doing business in Texas," but to
inquire whether the jurisdiction in question satisfies constitutional standards.
7. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 80 L. Ed. 2d 404
(1984).
8. 687 S.W.2d 42 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]), writ ref'd n.r.e., 699 S.W.2d 199
(Tex. 1985).
9. 687 S.W.2d at 46-47.
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purposefully to avail itself of the economic benefits of the Texas market.
Based on these factual findings, 10 the trial court concluded that dismissal
because of lack of personal jurisdiction was warranted because (1) Kawa-
saki's few direct contacts with the state of Texas, limited primarily to the
operation of the Houston office, did not satisfy the due process standards of
judicial jurisdiction, (2) Kawasaki had such minimal contacts with Texas
that maintenance of the suit would offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice, considering the quality, nature, and extent of Kawasaki's
activity in Texas, the relative convenience to the parties, the forum's duty to
offer the protection of its law to the parties, as well as the basic equities of
the situation, and (3) Kawasaki's activity in Texas did not suggest that it had
purposefully availed itself of the benefits of the forum."
Before addressing the merits of the trial court's conclusions, the court of
appeals noted that the crucial period for Kawasaki's amenability to Texas
service of process was the time when the pipe was sold and failed in 1979.
At that time, Kawasaki still had its office in Houston, before its replacement
by Kawasaki Steel America, an American subsidiary created in 1981. In
making this point the court quoted Collins v. Mize:12 "We see no problem of
due process when the forum state is determining a controversy arising out of
a transaction consummated in the forum state at a time when the defendant
himself was a resident of the forum state."13 The emphasized phrase is note-
worthy because it foreshadows the appellate court's conclusion that Middle-
ton's counterclaim arose out of Kawasaki's activities in the Houston office.
Although the court did not use the term, this is specific jurisdiction.
Turning to the merits of the lower court's dismissal, the court of appeals
first considered the trial court's fact findings regarding Kawasaki's activity
in Texas at the crucial time in 1979 when the pipe casings failed in Middle-
ton's west Texas well. 14 The court left intact the finding that Kawasaki's
Houston office was used for promotion only and never for sales, but dis-
carded the finding that Kawasaki had not purposefully availed itself of Texas
benefits by its Houston promotional activities.' 5 The court noted that asser-
tion of jurisdiction depends upon the existence of three elements. First, Ka-
wasaki must have purposefully done some act or consummated some
transaction in Texas. Second, Middleton's cause of action must have arisen
from, or have been connected with, that transaction. Finally, the forum
state's assumption of jurisdiction must not offend traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.16 From the trial evidence the court ascertained
that Kawasaki had placed its employees in Houston, the oil and gas capital
of the nation, to perform market research and to promote sales.' 7 As a re-
10. They were labelled as fact findings by the trial court. Id. at 45.
11. Id. at 46.
12. 447 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1969).
13. Id. at 675-76 (emphasis added).
14. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
15. 687 S.W.2d at 45.
16. Id. at 46.
17. Id.
1986]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
suit, the court found, Kawasaki annually shipped 210 metric tons of steel to
Houston.1 8 Because Kawasaki manufactured the pipe purchased from
Oilworld, the court found that Middleton's cause of action was connected
with Kawasaki's purposeful activity in Texas. 19 The court therefore con-
cluded that the assertion of Texas jurisdiction was acceptable under tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice. 20
One other ground for the trial court's dismissal of Kawasaki from the
lawsuit was improper service under the long-arm statute. Middleton served
process on Kawasaki's employee, Mr. Toshikazu Tomita, in Kawasaki's
Houston office. Middleton alleged that Kawasaki was a New York corpora-
tion licensed to do business in Texas with Mr. Tomita as its registered Texas
agent. Middleton erred in its allegations about Kawasaki's Texas contacts.
Kawasaki Steel was a Japanese corporation not licensed to do business in
Texas and had no registered Texas agent. In April 1, 1981 Kawasaki's
Houston office became Kawasaki Steel America, wholly-owned subsidiary of
the Japanese parent, Kawasaki Steel. Kawasaki Steel America is a New
York corporation licensed to do business in Texas, and Mr. Tomita became
its general manager and registered Texas agent in April, 1981. Thus Middle-
ton confused the parent Japanese manufacturer, Kawasaki Steel, with an
American subsidiary that did not exist at the time Middleton's claim arose in
1979. Kawasaki objected to the manner of service, arguing for jurisdictional
dismissal. The appellate court held that Kawasaki's objection to the manner
of service was improperly raised in a Rule 120a special appearance to chal-
lenge jurisdiction. Instead, the court observed, Kawasaki should have lim-
ited its Rule 120a objection to its minimum contacts arguments, and if it
lost, immediately filed a motion to quash service. Because Kawasaki raised
defective service in a Rule 120a hearing, it waived the objection and thereby
thwarted the purpose of the special hearing, that is, it turned a special ap-
pearance into a general appearance and thus bound itself to the lawsuit. 21
One may agree with the court's holding that Kawasaki should be amena-
ble to Texas jurisdiction for Middleton's counterclaim, but reject the court's
reasoning behind that conclusion. The court's justification for Texas juris-
diction over Kawasaki was specific jurisdiction-that Middleton's cause of
action arose from Kawasaki's Houston activity. Kawasaki limited those ac-
tivities, however, to market research and information gathering, which,
though apparently aimed at increasing Kawasaki's sales in Texas and the
United States, had nothing to do with particular sales, including the sale to
Middleton. Thus Kawasaki's Houston activity had nothing to do with Mid-
dleton's cause of action. The Houston office did nothing to solicit, process,
or accept the order from Middleton. Middleton contracted with Oilworld
and did not depend on the Houston Kawasaki office in any way during the
contract's negotiation, agreement, performance, and breach.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 46-48. See infra notes 140-53 and accompanying text for further discussion.
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Arguably Kawasaki ought to be subject to the general jurisdiction of
Texas courts in this case, based on its general activity of promoting its prod-
ucts here and the failure of its products in Texas. General jurisdiction re-
quires more strict connections than specific jurisdiction,22 but Kawasaki
probably meets those stricter general jurisdiction standards in this case. The
court nonetheless should not have allowed jurisdiction here under the rubric
of specific jurisdiction because the connection between Kawasaki's Houston
activities and Middleton's contract with Oilworld is dubious.
The Texas Supreme Court issued a per curiam opinion (Kawasaki I1), up-
holding jurisdiction in Kawasaki I on different grounds.23 The supreme
court ignored the court of appeals' analysis of specific jurisdiction, and in-
stead adopted the stream of commerce doctrine from World-Wide Volk-
swagen Corporation v. Woodson.24 The stream of commerce doctrine states
that when a foreign manufacturer places its goods in the interstate or inter-
national stream of commerce with a reasonably forseeable chance that some
of those goods will enter the forum state, the forum state acquires jurisdic-
tion over disputes based on those goods. The supreme court noted ample
facts in the Kawasaki I record to support application of the stream of com-
merce doctrine, particularly as to Kawasaki's knowledge that Texas resi-
dents would use its goods. The Kawasaki 11 opinion is superior because it
abandons the court of appeals' weak reasoning that based specific jurisdic-
tion primarily on a connection between Middleton's injury and Kawasaki's
Houston promotional activity. By abandoning the court of appeals' cause
and effect analysis and adopting the stream of commerce doctrine, the
supreme court made jurisdiction over Kawasaki more palatable.
Although the Texas Supreme Court did not mention Helicol or specific
jurisdiction in Kawasaki 11, the stream of commerce doctrine apparently
draws from specific jurisdiction concepts because it ties the forum state's
jurisdiction to the defendant's actions that caused injury in the forum state.
On the other hand, one could argue that stream of commerce jurisdiction
has aspects of both general and specific jurisdiction, and yet is neither. Ka-
wasaki's jurisdictional facts present a good example of this duality in the
stream of commerce doctrine. Kawasaki's stream of commerce jurisdiction
is unlike specific jurisdiction because it does not depend on Kawasaki's activ-
ity in Texas,25 although the court did consider the Houston promotional
22. The notion that general jurisdiction requires more thorough contacts is not explicit in
Helicol, but is a compelling inference. See 104 S. Ct. at 1872, 1876 n.1, 80 L. Ed. 2d 410-11,
416 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing Rosenberg Bros. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S.
516 (1923), and the notion that general jurisdiction requires contacts that amount to the de-
fendant's being "present" in the forum).
23. 699 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. 1985). A per curiam "writ ref'd n.r.e." (no reversible error)
means that the higher court agreed with the outcome but not with the reasoning.
24. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). The stream of commerce doctrine was developed in federal cir-
cuit courts following dicta in World-Wide Volkswagen. See Kawasaki 11, 699 S.W.2d at 201.
Kawasaki II upheld the court of appeals ruling that a motion to quash service constituted a
general appearance, even when raised in a Rule 120a special appearance. This important rul-
ing is discussed in the Notice section, see infra notes 140-53 and accompanying text.
25. Even though the court of appeals held that Kawasaki's Houston activities were the
basis of jurisdiction, the Texas Supreme Court avoided this analysis and focused instead on
19861
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activity as part of the stream of commerce calculus. Instead jurisdiction de-
pends on the fact that Kawasaki placed its products in the stream of com-
merce by allowing Japan Cotton to distribute them, through Oilworld, into
markets that included Texas. Under the stream of commerce doctrine these
actions by Kawasaki, which were principally centered in Japan, would pre-
sumably produce Texas jurisdiction for any dispute arising in Texas over
Kawasaki products. Nonetheless Kawasaki's stream of commerce actions
would not produce Texas jurisdiction for disputes arising outside of Texas.
In this respect Kawasaki's stream-of-commerce jurisdiction resembles spe-
cific jurisdiction more than general. For example, an Oklahoma plaintiff
who lost money from a Kawasaki pipe casing failure in an Oklahoma oil
field presumably could not sue Kawasaki in Texas.
If Kawasaki IIs jurisdictional argument represents a middle ground be-
tween general and specific jurisdiction, the resulting confusion may require
more detailed guidelines from the United States Supreme Court on the theo-
retical bases of personal jurisdiction. We may have come to the point of
needing statutory guidelines, either in uniform state legislation or federal
statutes similar to the federal Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act governing
conflicting state dispositions of child custody cases. 26
The second notable lng-arm case of the Survey period is Beechem v. Pip-
pin,27 in which Texas-resident Beechem sued Georgia-resident Pippin for
breach of contract. Beechem manufactures, leases, and sells Terragator
sludge applicators in Bell County, Texas and advertises them in nationally-
circulated trade magazines. Pippin initiated the contract from Georgia by
placing two phone calls to Beechem in Texas. A subsequent written contract
provided for Beechem to lease the Terragator to Pippin. Pippin made pay-
ments by mail to Beechem in Bell County. Pippin also arranged for an in-
dependent carrier to haul the Terragator to Georgia, and he insured the
move. A dispute arose and Beechem sued Pippin in Bell County for breach
of contract. Pippin moved to dismiss the lack of personal jurisdiction. The
trial court agreed and dismissed the complaint for lack of specific jurisdic-
tion.28 Beechem appealed, arguing that Pippin's acts established a basis for
jurisdiction.
The court of appeals agreed in a lengthy analysis of every component of
the state's power over nonresidents. The court first examined the Texas
long-arm statute, considering the definition and scope of "doing business" in
Texas as a basis for jurisdiction over non-Texans. The court ruled that the
Texas legislature intended for the Texas jurisdiction to extend as far as the
federal constitution allows, that is, over foreign defendants doing the consti-
Kawasaki's activities in Japan that caused their products to be placed in the stream of com-
merce. 699 S.W.2d at 201.
26. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982), discussed infra at notes 109-34 and accompanying text.
The Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act governs state subject matter jurisdiction of child cus-
tody cases, but is based on residency and contacts similar to personal jurisdiction.
27. 686 S.W.2d 356 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, no writ).
28. Id. at 358.
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tutional minimum of business in Texas. 29 The court was guided in its analy-
sis of long-arm reach by the recent Texas Helicol decision. 30 In Helicol the
Texas Supreme Court noted the difference between specific and general juris-
diction. General jurisdiction, the court observed, requires a greater quality
and/or quantity of contracts between the lawsuit and the forum than specific
jurisdiction. Once those greater contracts are shown, however, the defend-
ant may be sued in Texas for causes of action unrelated to the defendant's
activity in Texas. 3'
Having posed the general/specific jurisdiction possibilities, the court of
appeals stated that Beechem was a case of specific jurisdiction. 32 In other
words, Pippin's acts in Texas directly related to the lawsuit. Thus the con-
tacts between Pippin and the forum need not have been of the same high
quality and/or quantity as for general jurisdiction, but only enough to estab-
lish that the Texas contacts existed, and that they related to Beechem's law-
suit. The court of appeals therefore declined application of Helicol's
formulas for general jurisdiction, lawsuit unrelated to defendant's forum
contracts, to the facts in Beechem. Helicol directed Beechem's analysis to
specific jurisdiction, but had no further impact.
The court then turned to the other component of state jurisdiction-fed-
eral due process. The court listed several standards that bore on whether the
exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with due process: minimum con-
tacts,33 the quality and quantity of contacts, 34 the degree to which the de-
fendant has availed himself of the benefits and protections of the forum, 35
and the likelihood that the defendant could foresee the possibility of personal
jurisdiction in the forum state. 36 To this list the court added Professor
Brilmayer's theorem that the quality and quantity of contacts reveal the ex-
tent to which the defendant's activity in the forum puts the forum's residents
at risk, thus creating a point at which the state acquires a regulatory interest
over the defendant. 37 Reiterating the general/specific jurisdiction distinc-
tion, the court noted that some contacts are so great that the cause of action
29. Texas courts have often observed that the Texas long-arm statute is intended to have
the maximum constitutional reach. Reiteration seemed appropriate here, as the court of ap-
peals noted that fourteenth amendment due process was the real jurisdictional issue. The
court concluded that in Beechem and future cases involving nonresident defendants with busi-
ness connections to Texas, the jurisdictional issue would not be to define "doing business," but
to examine the pertinent judicial interpretations of due process. 686 S.W.2d at 359.
30. Hall v. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A., 638 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1982), rev'd
on other grounds, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 80 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1984).
31. Id. at 872.
32. 686 S.W.2d at 359.
33. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462-64 (1940).
34. See Calder v. Jones, 104 S. Ct. 1482, 1486, 79 L. Ed. 2d 804, 811 (1984).
35. See Hansen v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
36. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
37. Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction,
1980 S. CT. REV. 77, 87 (hereinafter cited as Brilmayer). Note that this notion of state interest
(the degree of risk to local citizens) is a valid jurisdictional issue according to both Brilmayer
and the Beechem court, while the state interest expressed in legislation is not. See infra note
40.
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does not have to be related, such as when a defendant corporation has a
branch office in the forum. A more compelling case for jurisdiction exists,
however, when the defendant's contacts with the forum relate to the cause of
action. Even in specific jurisdiction cases, however, more than a mere rela-
tion must exist between the defendant's actions in the forum and the
lawsuit.38
The court next addressed and discarded two other arguable components
of personal jurisdiction: the burden on the defendant, and the forum state's
interest in the litigation. The court suggested that once minimum contacts
were found, the inquiry should turn to the fairness of requiring a nonresident
to defend in Texas. The court disregarded this inquiry, however, concluding
that fairness is an issue of venue and inconvenient forum and not of jurisdic-
tion.39 Similarly, the court dismissed state interest as a valid component of
personal jurisdiction, reasoning that consideration of the forum's interest in
the litigation confuses a legislative wish to assert jurisdiction with the consti-
tutional right to do so.40
Having stated the pertinent standards under Texas long-arm law and fed-
eral due process, and having discarded state interest and fairness to the de-
fendant, the court of appeals restated the applicable jurisdictional equation:
Personal jurisdiction over non-Texans requires an examination of the nature
and number of the defendant's contacts with the forum. Particular consider-
ation should be given to (1) the degree to which defendant availed himself of
the forum's benefits and protections, (2) the foreseeability of in-state effects
traceable to defendants acts in or out of the forum, and (3) the degree to
which Texas citizens41 are put at risk by the defendant's acts. 42 The court
re-emphasized that a stronger relationship between plaintiff's cause of action
and the above contracts increases the likelihood of finding personal
jurisdiction.43
With the jurisdictional rule stated, the court reviewed the facts, prefacing
the factual recitations with its conclusion that Beechem's cause of action
arose out of Pippin's contacts with Texas. The court noted that Pippin initi-
ated the negotiations by calling Beechem in Texas,44 that Beechem signed
38. 686 S.W.2d at 360 (citing U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 533 S.W.2d 760 (Tex.
1977)).
39. Id. Those precedents favoring a weighing of defendant's litigation burden include
World- Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292-94 and D.J. Investments v. Metzler Motorcycle Tire
Agent Gregg, Inc., 754 F.2d 542, 545 (5th Cir. 1985) (defendant's inconvenience represents
one facet of personal jurisdiction issue); see also G.R.M. v. Equine Inv. & Management Group,
596 F. Supp. 307, 315 (S.D. Tex. 1984) (to satisfy due process requirements defendant's burden
must be equitable).
40. 686 S.W.2d at 360-61 (citing Brilmayer, supra note 33, at 107). State interest in the
litigation and the burden on the nonresident defendant are unique to each case and hard to
measure (too hard in the Beechem case). By limiting the jurisdictional analysis to contacts, the
equation is simpler and more objective, though perhaps less fair to nonresidents.
41. "Citizens" should perhaps be "residents."
42. 686 S.W.2d at 361.
43. Id.
44. Beechem's national advertising could be construed as a general solicitation for busi-
ness that led to Pippin's call, meaning that Pippin did not initiate the contract, but merely
acted on Beechem's solicitation. In fact, the court noted this ambiguity as to the offeror's
[Vol. 40
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the contract in Texas, and that Pippin made payments by mail to Beechem
in Texas. Pippin thus fell within the Hansen v. Denckla standard of personal
jurisdiction, having "purposely [availed themselves] of the privilege of con-
ducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and pro-
tections of its laws." 45 The court added that a lawsuit was foreseeable in this
instance, and that Pippin's actions placed Texas citizens at risk.46
Pippin argued that the facts at issue were similar to those in U-Anchor
Advertising, Inc. v. Burt,47 a much-cited Texas long-arm case that denied
jurisdiction over an Oklahoma buyer of a Texas product. The court saw
some similarity in U-Anchor but distinguished it on the ground that U-
Anchor's Texas seller went to the Oklahoma buyer to solicit, negotiate, and
sign the contract. 48 The only Texas contact was the Oklahoma buyer's mail-
ing his payments to Amarillo. The court also invoked McGee v. Interna-
tional Life Insurance Co. 49 to justify jurisdiction over Beechem. McGee was
a California lawsuit arising from the renegotiation of an insurance contract.
A Californian purchased an insurance policy that was later reassigned to a
Texas insurance company, International Life. When renewal time came, the
insured renewed with International Life, who mailed the new policy to Cali-
fornia. Upon the insured's death, the California beneficiary sued to collect,
and then filed the California judgment in a Texas court. The Texas court
denied enforcement based on a lack of California jurisdiction over the Texas
insurance company. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding
that it was sufficient that the suit was based on a contract that had a substan-
tial connection to California. Thus the Texas insurer was subject to Califor-
nia jurisdiction even though the insurer had never directly solicited business
in California, having merely renewed the policy. The Beechem court noted
that the McGee-type contacts were perhaps the least permissible for asserting
jurisdiction, but that Beechem contained McGee's important feature, the so-
licitation of the contract, which for Beechem and Pippin occurred in
Texas. 50
The court made two final points. First, it clarified that Beechem does not
hold that merely contracting with a Texas resident will always result in
Texas jurisdiction.5 ' Then the court underscored its assurance that it had
not assumed extraordinary jurisdiction by noting that Pippin owned real and
personal property in Texas, and had conducted sales there. While property
ownership does not in and of itself establish personal jurisdiction for an un-
identity, 686 S.W.2d at 362 n.2. This ambiguity, however, does not affect jurisdiction.
Beechem's national advertising might subject him to Georgia jurisdiction, but that does not
diminish Pippin's contacts with Texas. Both Georgia and Texas are seemingly proper forums.
45. Id. at 361.
46. The court does not describe the risk other than stating that it lay in Pippin's perform-
ing or not performing the contract. Id.
47. 553 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. 1977).
48. 686 S.W.2d at 361-62.
49. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
50. 686 S.W.2d at 362.
51. Id. at 363.
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related lawsuit, 52 it is a consideration in determining whether Pippin has so
enjoyed the benefits and protection of the Texas forum that he should be
compelled to defend in Texas courts, even in matters unrelated to his prop-
erty. Thus the court established general jurisdiction over Pippin as an after-
thought to specific jurisdiction.
Unlike Kawasaki I, Beechem offers a solid basis for specific jurisdiction.
Pippin sought out a Texas product, negotiated and finalized the agreement in
Texas, and sent payments to Beechem in Texas. Out of these Texas contacts
a dispute arose, and Texas courts provide a viable forum for that dispute,
though not necessarily the exclusive forum. Although Beechem's national
advertising and interstate sales may have made him equally amenable to suit
in the Georgia courts, it seems just as proper to have brought Pippin before a
Texas court.
Beechem and Kawasaki are important because they further define "doing
business" in Texas under federal constitutional standards. Kawasaki I held
that a Houston-based promotional office for a Japanese manufacturer is suffi-
cient business in Texas to require the manufacturer to defend a breach of
contract lawsuit by a west Texas customer, even when the lawsuit and its
underlying contract at best indirectly relate to the Houston promotional ac-
tivities. In Kawasaki II, however, the Texas Supreme Court under cut Ka-
wasaki 's "doing business" equation by applying the stream of commerce
doctrine as a sounder basis for jurisdiction. Beechem held that a Texas prod-
uct ordered by telephone from Georgia with the Texas-to-Georgia shipment
arranged by the Georgia purchaser provides sufficient Texas business activ-
ity for exercise of personal jurisdiction over the Georgia purchaser.
Beechem and Kawasaki are also significant because they employ the specific/
general jurisdictional concept from Helicol,5 3 the Texas case in which the
United States Supreme Court promulgated yet another paradigm for state
judicial jurisdiction.5 4 Beechem expressly invoked Helicol, while in Kawa-
52. See id. (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977)).
53. 104 S. Ct. 1868, 1872, 80 L. Ed. 2d 404, 410-11 (1984).
54. There was a time when major changes in the constitutional standards for state judicial
jurisdiction occurred several years apart, giving lawyers time to learn the new standards. The
first clear standard came from Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878), and its holding that
physical presence within the forum state was the basis of personal jurisdiction. Harris v. Balk,
198 U.S. 215 (1905), clarified the in rem and quasi in rem bases of jurisdiction. Hess v. Pawl-
oski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927), marked the first small move away from Pennoyer and the physical
presence test in its creation of the legal fiction that nonresidents motorists "appointed" a state
official as agent for service of process, and thus were deemed to consent to jurisdiction for
litigation based on their accidents in the forum state. In 1930 Learned Hand developed the
minimum contacts analysis in Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930),
but left Pennoyer intact. Fifteen years passed before the minimum contacts notion became
effective in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), with its adoption of a
fairness test of jurisdiction, and the displacing of the Pennoyer model for personal jurisdiction.
Seven years later, Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining, 342 U.S. 437 (1952) expanded
International Shoe by allowing state jurisdiction over a foreign corporation for a cause of ac-
tion arising outside the forum because the defendant corporation's contacts with the forum
were very substantial. Id. at 447-48. Five years later, McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,
355 U.S. 220 (1957) again expanded minimum contacts, holding that a single transaction,
contract or tort, might be sufficient for personal jurisdiction if it amounts to a "substantial
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saki I the court of appeals used the same specific jurisdiction model without
mentioning Helicol.
A 1985 United States Supreme Court decision offers yet newer develop-
ments in the personal jurisdiction equation. Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz55 involved a breach of contract action by the parent franchisor in
Florida against Michigan franchisees. The Michigan defendant had a
connection" with the forum state. Id. at 223. McGee's facts and holding resemble 1985's
Burger King decision.
The first restriction on minimum contacts occurred the following year with Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) which held that personal jurisdiction does not exist unless the
defendant commits "some act by which he purposely avails himself of the privilege of con-
ducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefit and protection of its laws."
Id. at 253.
The expansion of minimum contacts resumed in 1966 with Seider v. Roth, 216 N.E.2d 312
(N.Y. 1966), a seminal state court opinion offering the most extreme of the quasi in rem theo-
ries. Seider allowed the attachment of an automobile insurer's obligation to defend and indem-
nify the driver as a basis for jurisdiction in any state where the insurer did business, even
though the obligation to defend and indemnify did not arise under the insurance contract until
a court had validly assumed jurisdiction over the policy holder. In other words, Seider author-
ized bootstrap jurisdiction. Seider was adopted by several states, including California and
Minnesota, and led to the watershed opinion eleven years later in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186 (1977). Shaffer overruled Pennoyer and Harris v. Balk and held that the International
Shoe minimum contacts test applied not only to jurisdiction over persons, but also to jurisdic-
tion over property in the belief that all adjudication concerned the rights of people, not the
rights of property. Id. at 207. Follow-up decisions were needed to clarify the Shaffer standard
(lawyers and judges were reluctant to give up the in rem and quasi in rem bases of jurisdic-
tion), and those necessary clarifying decisions began to come more quickly. One year after
Shaffer, Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978) held that a nonresident father was not
subject to California jurisdiction to modify child support merely for having sent his daughter
to live with her mother in California. Id. at 94. Two years after Kulko, World-Wide Volk-
swagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) further restricted state court jurisdiction by denying
Oklahoma jurisdiction over a New York-based car dealer and distributor for an Oklahoma
accident that injured New York plaintiffs en route to California, thereby affirming the need for
some contacts between the forum state and foreign defendants. Id. at 298. Rush v. Savchuk,
444 U.S. 320 (1980), issued with World- Wide Volkswagen, also restricted state court jurisdic-
tion by disallowing Seider actions, and making clear that such actions must satisfy Shaffer
minimum contacts standards. Id. at 332.
In 1982, Insurance Corp. v. Compagnie Des Bauxites de Guinea, 456 U.S. 694 (1982), held
that state sovereignty was no longer the underlying justification for state judicial jurisdiction,
and that sovereignty was replaced with the 14th amendment's guidelines on individual liberty
and the permissible restrictions on that liberty. Id. at 702 n. 10.
The Supreme Court had a bumper crop in 1984, with three significant jurisdictional develop-
ments for state courts. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 80
L. Ed. 2d 404 (1984) offered the general/specific jurisdiction models, in spite of the decision's
denial of Texas jurisdiction in that case. Id. at 1874, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 414. The dissent, how-
ever, believed that Texas had specific jurisdiction, which the majority failed to address fully.
Id. at 1879, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 419-20 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 104
S. Ct. 1473, 79 L. Ed. 2d 790 (1984), held that New Hampshire jurisdiction could be based on
the defendant magazine's sales there. The fact that the plaintiff had no New Hampshire con-
tacts, other than a liking for its longer statute of limitations for libel claims, was irrelevant to
jurisdiction over Hustler Magazine since there is no minimum contacts requirement for plain-
tiffs. Id. at 1481, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 801-02. Calder v. Jones, 104 S. Ct. 1482, 1486-87, 79 L. Ed.
2d 804, 812 (1984), produced the "effects test" with its holding that California jurisdiction
could be based on the effects plaintiff Shirley Jones felt in California as a result of statements in
the defendant's newspaper, The National Enquirer. In 1985 the Supreme Court offered yet
another significant state jurisdiction case, Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 105 S. Ct. 2174,
85 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1985).
55. 105 S. Ct. 2174, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1985).
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twenty-year contract with Miami-based Burger King to operate a Burger
King franchise in Michigan. The contract stipulated that its formation and
execution was in Miami, that Florida law governed the agreement, that all
monthly franchise payments and other fees would be sent to Miami, that the
Miami office would receive all contractual notices, and that the Miami office
would set all policies and resolve all disputes. Day-to-day operations, how-
ever, were managed by district offices that reported to the Miami office.
In executing and performing this contract defendant Rudzewicz never set
foot in Miami, although his partner MacShara attended a brief training
course in Miami to prepare him for managing the restaurant. The Eleventh
Circuit held that MacShara's Miami presence was irrelevant to the jurisdic-
tional issue because MacShara and Rudzewicz were not partners.5 6 The
Supreme Court observed that even if MacShara and Rudzewicz were not
partners, the corporate decision by Rudzewicz and MacShara to send Mac-
Shara to Miami could subject Rudzewicz to Florida jurisdiction. 57 Mac-
Shara's Miami training, however, was not pivotal to the disposition of this
case because jurisdiction over Rudzewicz was established on other
grounds.58
The Court held that a forum-based contract alone is not determinative of
jurisdiction over nonresident contracting parties. 59  In certain circum-
stances, however, including Rudzewicz's, "[A] forum may assert specific ju-
risdiction over a nonresident defendant where an alleged injury arises out of
or relates to actions by the defendant himself that are purposefully directed
toward forum residents, and where jurisdiction would not otherwise offend
'fair play and substantial justice.' "60 The Court found that Rudzewicz's
out-of-state contacts with Miami by mail, telephone, and wire communica-
tions were sufficient to compel him to defend in Florida. The Court further
found that the contracts' choice of Florida law was relevant to the personal
jurisdiction equation, although not dispositive.61 Moreover, the court found
ample evidence in Rudzewicz's actions to support their conclusion that
Rudzewicz had purposefully availed himself of Florida benefits and protec-
tions in his Burger King contract, and that as an accountant and investor,
Rudzewicz had sufficient cognizance of the contract's implications for Flor-
ida jurisdiction.62
Burger King did not establish a distinctly new jurisdictional paradigm. It
did, however, clarify state judicial power over nonresidents by spelling out
the test for judicial jurisdiction based only on the contract. 63 Finally, Burger
56. 724 F.2d 1505, 1513 n.4 (1lth Cir. 1984).
57. 105 S. Ct. at 2186 n.22, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 545 n.22.
58. Id.
59. See id. at 2176, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 534 (Court Syllabus); id. at 2185, 2189, 85 L. Ed. 2d at
545, 549-50.
60. Id. at 2176, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 534 (Court Syllabus) (emphasis original). Even though
the Supreme Court syllabus is not a part of the opinion for precedent purposes, this quote
provides a good synopsis for this brief review of Burger King.
61. Id. at 2187, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 547.
62. Id. at 2186-89, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 545-49.
63. Factors that determine jurisdiction based on contractual dealings within the forum
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King affirmed that a contractual choice of law clause is relevant to determi-
nation of judicial jurisdiction.
2. State Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Federal Courts. Several noteworthy fed-
eral court applications of Texas long-arm jurisdiction under 203 1b occurred
during the survey period. D.J. Inv. v. Metzeler Motorcycle Tire Agent Gregg,
Inc. 64 involved a diversity action for breach of oral contract and fraud.
Plaintiff D.J. Investments, a Texas corporation, attempted through its agent
Hovers to purchase Van Sickler's Race Ready, the exclusive Texas distribu-
tor for Metzeler motorcycle tires, which were manufactured in Washington
state. Hovers contacted Metzeler owner, Robert Gregg, and told Gregg that
D.J. Investments was interested in buying Race Ready if it could continue to
be the exclusive Metzeler distributor in Texas. According to Hovers, Gregg
agreed that D.J. Investments could have the exclusive distributorship if it
submitted an irrevocable letter of credit for $30,600.28 to cover Race
Ready's current Metzeler stock, and if D.J. Investments acquired Race
Ready. Hovers and Gregg held their discussions by telephone between
Texas and Washington, except for one when Gregg flew to Texas, met with
Hovers, and agreed to the distributorship. During these negotiations,
Hovers alleged, Gregg told him that he was making no other deals with
anyone for a Texas Metzeler distributorship.
D.J. Investments sent the irrevocable letter of credit to Metzeler and
bought Van Sickler's Race Ready for $400,000. Hovers called Gregg to tell
him the letter of credit had been mailed, and Gregg allegedly assured him of
their agreement. Six days later, however, Metzeler Company cancelled the
agreement. D.J. Investments requested return of its letter of credit but was
refused. D.J. Investments brought suit in federal district court alleging a
breach of their oral agreement and fraud in that Gregg had already made a
deal with someone else for an exclusive Metzeler distributionship in Texas.
The district court found that Gregg and his company had no place of
business in Texas, no employees in Texas, no agent for service of process in
Texas, and no permit to do business in Texas. Gregg's only contacts with
Texas were calls to Hovers and one visit to the Dallas/Fort Worth airport.
The court further found that although Gregg had been selling his Metzeler
tires in Texas through Race Ready, the instant contract was solicited by
Hovers. Based on this, the court dismissed the case for insufficient contacts
with Texas.65
D.J. Investments appealed and the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that
sufficient Texas contacts existed. 66 The court held that the small number of
Texas contacts were not determinative in this case. Rather, the court de-
clared that "[t]he more important issue is whether the defendants engaged in
activity, including activity 'outside the state that has reasonably foreseeable
included (1) prior negotiations, (2) contemplated future consequences, (3) the contract's terms,
and (4) the parties' actual course of dealing. Id. at 2186, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 528.
64. 754 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1985).
65. Id. at 543-44.
66. Id. at 547-49.
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consequences in the state,' by which they purposely availed themselves of the
benefits and protections of the forum state's law."' 67 In deciding this issue
the court noted that the injurious effect of Gregg's acts was felt in Texas,
that Gregg purposefully directed his activity at Texas, and that Gregg's con-
tacts with Texas were intentional and not fortuitous. 68
The Fifth Circuit applied a distinctive two-part test in deciding the juris-
dictional question. First, the nonresident must have some minimum con-
tacts with the forum resulting from an affirmative act or acts on their part.
Second it must not be unfair or unreasonable to require the nonresident to
defend the suit in the forum state.6 9 This differs from Helicol and other
United States Supreme Court opinions because it makes fairness to the de-
fendant a distinct second test, after minimum contacts have been found.70 A
Texas court of appeals rejected this fairness consideration in Beechem v.
Pippin.7 1
Another interesting point in Metzeler relates to the choice of law clause as
a factor for judicial jurisdiction. The Metzeler district court based its dismis-
sal in part on an earlier Fifth Circuit decision, Hydrokinetics, Inc. v. Alaska
Mechanical, Inc.,72 in which the Fifth Circuit considered the parties' choice
of law agreement, choosing Alaska rather than Texas law, as a basis for
denying Texas jurisdiction over the defendant. In Metzeler the Fifth Circuit
found Hydrokinetics inapposite to Metzeler because the contract in Metzeler
contained no choice of law clause.7 3
Donovan v. Grim Hotel Co. illustrates a second instance of a Texas federal
court's using 2031b.74 Grim Hotels consist of five hotel corporations, each
corporation representing one hotel, and each owned by Charles Alberding.
The United States Department of Labor and 177 hotel workers sued Alberd-
ing and his five hotel corporations for violations of the Fair Labor Standards
Act, particularly as to minimum wage and overtime pay. In addition to
jurisdiction over the Texas hotels, the plaintiffs sought personal jurisdiction
against Alberding for his personal liability under federal labor law. Alberd-
ing, an Illinois resident, performed much of his hotel management work in
Illinois. When he did travel to Texas, he did so as president of the hotel
corporations.
67. Id. at 547 (quoting Prejean v. Sonatrach, Inc., 652 F.2d 1260, 1268 (5th Cir. 1981)).
68. Id. at 547-49.
69. Id. at 545.
70. The United States Supreme Court has incorporated a fairness doctrine, see e.g.,
World- Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292-94 (due process clauses guarantee fairness); Hanson,
357 U.S. at 259 (Black, J., dissenting) (jurisdiction held not unfair); id. at 263 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (jurisdiction held not unfair); International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319 (due process
concerns include fairness of administration of laws); id. at 324-26 (Black, J.) (use of term
"fairness" incorrectly limits powers constitutionally granted to states), but in doing so simply
used fairness as a justifying argument for minimum contacts. In fact, in World- Wide Volk-
swagen the Supreme Court stated that fairness is expressed as minimum contacts. 444 U.S. at
291-92; id. at 300-01 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
71. 686 S.W.2d at 360.
72. 700 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2180, 80 L. Ed. 2d 561 (1984).
73. 700 F.2d at 548.
74. 747 F.2d 966 (5th Cir. 1984).
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Alberding argued that the Texas federal court lacked personal jurisdiction
over him because his only contacts with Texas were in his role as corporate
president, thus giving him a fiduciary shield to personal liability. The trial
court overruled Alberding's objections to personal jurisdiction, entered par-
tial summary judgment as to liability, and enjoined the hotels from continu-
ing this practice.7 5 On appeal the Fifth Circuit upheld the trial court's
assertion of personal jurisdiction over Alberding on the grounds that Al-
berding had sufficient contacts with Texas in his management of the five
hotels, and that he had no fiduciary shield because his liability did not derive
from his status as corporate president.7 6 Rather, the court concluded that
his liability resulted from violations of federal law for which he was person-
ally accountable. Moreover, the court found that his out-of-state activities
squarely fit within the long-arm statute's definition of doing business in
Texas.
77
In Maurice Pierce and Associates v. Computerage78 the defendant success-
fully challenged 2031b service of process in a federal diversity action for
breach of contract. The court's reasoning, however, had nothing to do with
a minimum contacts analysis. The court based the dismissal on plaintiff's
failure to allege a contractual relationship with the out-of-state defendant,
and a failure to demonstrate sufficient agency or alter ego ties between the
out-of-state defendant and the in-state defendants who were validly in the
lawsuit. The case illustrates the importance of pleading all essentials, even in
the era of notice pleading.
Finally, one non-Texas case is of interest to Texans. In Pedelahore v. As-
tropark, Inc.79 a Houston amusement park was subjected to personal juris-
diction in an eastern Louisiana federal court for a personal injury action by
local Louisiana residents injured in a Texas amusement park. In upholding
the trial court's finding of jurisdiction, the Fifth Circuit relied on the exten-
siveness of the Louisiana long-arm statute, and the amusement park's exten-
sive solicitation of business from Louisiana. 80
3. Personal Jurisdiction for Federal Claims. Texas federal courts produced
two noteworthy cases in 1985 regarding personal jurisdiction for federal
question claims. GRM v. Equine Investment Group81 involved a securities
fraud action under the federal securities acts82 with a pendent claim under
Texas law. The plaintiffs were Texas residents who had invested in a Florida
limited partnership known as The Arabian Breeding Program I. Defendants
included Andover Funding Limited, a South Dakota general partnership
with a Delaware corporation as its corporate general partner, and Andover
75. Id. at 968.
76. Id. at 973.
77. Id.
78. 608 F. Supp. 173 (N.D. Tex. 1985).
79. 745 F.2d 346 (5th Cir. 1984).
80. Id. at 350.
81. 596 F. Supp. 307 (S.D. Tex. 1984).
82. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa 1982; Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982).
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Financial Corporation, a Maine corporation with its principal place of busi-
ness in Connecticut. In moving for dismissal the defendants argued that the
Texas long-arm statute did not provide the Houston federal court with juris-
diction,8 3 that federal securities law did not provide personal jurisdiction,
that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants because they
had no contacts with Texas, and that applying the statute to the defendants
violated the fifth amendment.8 4 Plaintiffs alleged a common securities fraud
scheme perpetrated by all of the defendants against the plaintiffs, all of
whom resided in Houston. The plaintiffs further alleged that all of the viola-
tions occurred in Texas, and that the negotiations were conducted by a pri-
vate placement memorandum and numerous interstate telephone calls to
Texas.8 5
The court held that it had personal jurisdiction over the defendants for
two reasons. First, the court held that Texas long-arm jurisdiction was irrel-
evant to this case because Congress had preempted state long-arm jurisdic-
tion for federal securities claims when it enacted section 78aa of the
Securities Exchange Act.8 6 Section 78aa governs all claims under the 1933
and 1934 Securities acts as well as all pendent state securities claims. Thus
the court held that 203 lb had no applicability to this case, either for the
state securities violations, or as an alternative service method for the federal
claims under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.8 7
The court then turned to a lengthy analysis of section 78aa. The court
began by noting that section 78aa authorizes personal jurisdiction in any
district where a defendant transacts business, inhabits, or can be found, or
any district where any act or transaction constituting the violation oc-
curred. 8 The defendants argued that section 78aa did not apply because all
of their alleged violations occurred outside of Texas, and the defendants
neither inhabited, transacted business, nor could be found in Texas. Because
the plaintiffs did not allege that the defendants transacted business, inhab-
ited, or could be found in Texas, personal jurisdiction would have to rest on
a violation having occurred in the Southern District of Texas. The defend-
ants argued that there were no such allegations in the plaintiff's complaint.
The court nonetheless held that the defendants were subject to jurisdiction
83. 599 F. Supp. at 311. FED. R. Ov. P. 4(e) invokes state long-arm rules in connection
with federal service of process in some federal question cases.
84. 96 F. Supp. at 310-11. In federally-based claims the minimum contacts standard is
imposed by the due process clause of the fifth amendment rather than the fourteenth
amendment.
85. Id. at 312.
86. Id. at 311.
87. FED. R. Civ. P. 4 under certain circumstances allows for federal service of process
under the state law of (1) the state in which the federal district court sits, see id. at 4(b) (notice
of service made pursuant to state statute must correspond to that state's law); id. at 4(c) (com-
plaint may be served in accordance with the law of the state where the district court sits); id. at
4(e) (service on party not found in district court's state may be made pursuant to state law), or
(2) the state in which service is made, see id. at 4(d)(2) (service upon infant or incompetent
must follow law of state in which service is made upon such defendants); id. at 4(d)(6) (service
upon state or municipal corporation may follow law of state in which service is made upon
such defendants). Id. at 4(i) has similar provisions for service in foreign countries.
88. 596 F. Supp. at 311.
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since the acts of their co-defendants, who did not challenge jurisdiction, oc-
curred in the Southern District of Texas, which is sufficient in an action
based on a common securities fraud scheme. Moreover, the court stated that
the act that ties the defendants to the district need not be crucial to the
fraud, but merely of material importance to the consummation of the
scheme. It is enough for one act by one co-defendant to "reach into" the
forum district to obtain investors. In this case the sufficient act was the tele-
phone calls to Houston by the co-defendants.8 9
The court then turned to the defendants' second argument, that even if
section 78aa bound them to this lawsuit based on their co-defendants' acts,
such jurisdictional assertions violated the minimum contacts test of fifth
amendment due process. The court disagreed. First, the court explained
that section 78aa allows for nationwide service of process if the defendant
has minimum contacts with the United States as a whole. 90 The court added
that most federal courts have held section 78aa's nationwide service consti-
tutional under the notion that jurisdiction is based on sovereignty; federal
jurisdictional statutes are thus geared to United States sovereignty, and
therefore extend to all United States boundaries. 9' The court continued,
however, to point out that the Supreme Court has recently rejected sover-
eignty as the basis of jurisdiction, replacing sovereignty with the due process
test that "maintenance of the suit not offend traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice."'92 The court observed that it could not equate the
"fair play and substantial justice" standard to nationwide boundaries, or for
that matter, to Texas boundaries. 93 Thus the court concluded that mini-
mum contacts with the forum, Texas or the United States, was not a proper
measure of fair play and substantial justice. Rather, the court considered the
following factors in examining personal jurisdiction:
(1) the defendants' burden in presenting a defense in the forum, (2) the
defendants' reasonable expectations and the foreseeability of litigation
in the forum, (3) the plaintiffs' interest in obtaining a convenient and
effective remedy, (4) the federal judiciary's interest in efficient resolution
of disputes, and (5) the forum's interest in adjudicating the dispute in a
local court.94
The court found that the defendants' burden in Texas litigation was not
too great, given modern travel and communication.9 5 The court further
found that defendants' reasonable expectations and the foreseeability of
Texas litigation favored jurisdiction over the defendants because of the na-
ture of defendants' multi-state business and their knowledge of their
89. Id. at 312.
90. Id. at 312-15.
91. Id. at 313.
92. Id. at 313-14 (discussing Insurance Corp. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea, 456
U.S. 694 (1982)).
93. 596 F. Supp. at 314 (citing Bamford v. Hobbs, 569 F. Supp. 160, 166 (S.D. Tex.
1983)).
94. 596 F. Supp. at 315.
95. Id. at 315-16.
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scheme's impact in Texas. 96 Moreover, the court determined that plaintiffs'
interest in joining all defendants in one action is great, and that it would
unduly burden the plaintiffs to have to sue the Andover defendants sepa-
rately in Connecticut.97 In addition, the court noted that the federal judicial
system had a similar interest in resolving this dispute in one court to con-
serve judicial resources. 98 Finally, the court found that Texas had an inter-
est in providing its residents a forum, and in protecting its residents from
fraud. 99 With all factors pointing toward jurisdiction over the defendants,
the court held that due process was satisfied. 100
GRM does not blaze any legal trails, but is significant in its reinforcement
of the holding in Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de
Guinea'01 that individual liberty, not state sovereignty, provides the founda-
tion of personal jurisdiction. Although the five-factor due process analysis
appears sound in GRM, the court seems to use the test as boilerplate for due
process standards. For example, the court resolves all five factors with such
pro-jurisdiction language that it seems that the defendants would have lost
under anyone of the factors standing alone. Multi-factor tests for judicial
jurisdiction and choice of law are meant to balance competing interests. An
objective application of these tests should in most cases produce some factors
favoring the nonresident defendant. It is burdensome for the Andover de-
fendants to litigate in Texas, and the foreseeability of Texas litigation by the
Andovers is questionable given their total lack of contact with Texas. This is
not to say the defendants' jurisdictional contacts did not establish jurisdic-
tion. But even if the defendants had planned their co-conspirators' Texas
activities, that does not make Texas litigation convenient for the Andovers.
Moreover, if the Andovers had no knowledge of their co-conspirators' Texas
contacts, and the facts do not indicate that they did, then Texas litigation
was not very foreseeable. The court need not stack the deck against nonresi-
dents when using the five-factor balancing tests. In GRM sufficient basis
existed for exercising Texas jurisdiction over the defendants since the plain-
tiffs' interest, the federal judiciary's interest, and Texas' interest in providing
a forum outweighed the burden on the defendants. Courts should nonethe-
less properly assess the defendant's burden for the balancing test to work.10 2
The second noteworthy federal jurisdiction case is Thomas v. Kadish,10 3 a
civil rights lawsuit against the State Bar of Texas and California law school
officials. Plaintiff, a University of California at Berkeley graduate, was de-
nied admission to the Texas Bar for his alleged mental and emotional unfit-
ness. As required by the Texas Bar application, plaintiff asked the law
96. Id. at 316-17.
97. Id. at 317-18.
98. Id. at 318.
99. Id. at 318-19.
100. Id. at 319.
101. 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
102. This possibly one-sided application of balancing tests may not be limited to judicial
jurisdiction. See infra notes 208-310 and accompanying text for a discussion of similar singu-
larity in choice of law analyses.
103. 748 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1984).
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school officials to verify his law degree and to comment on his good moral
character and emotional fitness. The officials confirmed plaintiff's law de-
gree but declined to comment on his moral character and emotional fitness.
Instead they furnished a copy of plaintiff's record, which revealed a series of
plaintiff's conflicts with other students and professors. Based on this, the
Texas Bar officials asked plaintiff to have a psychological examination, and
plaintiff agreed. The psychologists reported that plaintiff had serious emo-
tional problems, including a paranoid psychotic condition. The Texas Bar
denied plaintiff admission relying on these results.
Plaintiff ignored his appellate remedies in state district court,' ° 4 and in-
stead filed a federal civil rights action alleging state action by the Texas Bar
and a conspiracy by the law school officials.' 0 5 The only pertinent issue for
this Survey article is the personal jurisdiction over the nonresident California
defendants. 10 6 The trial court found no basis for personal jurisdiction, and
the Fifth Circuit confirmed, stating that neither plaintiff's allegations of a
conspiracy in California, nor the alleged effect of this conspiracy in Texas
established sufficient minimum contacts with Texas. 10 7
Divorce and Custody
Nine family law cases addressed jurisdictional points of Texas law during
the Survey period. ' 0 8 Heartfield v. Heartfieldt0 9 involved a Texas/Louisiana
conflict over the enforcement of contrary child support and visitation de-
crees. The Texas divorce awarded the mother custody of the three children,
setting child support at $2025 per month. The mother moved to Louisiana
and filed a new Texas action to relitigate child support and visitation. The
father counterclaimed for lower child support and increased visitation, and
he eventually won on both issues. Before the father's Texas court victory,
however, the mother petitioned a Louisiana court to enforce the original
Texas order. The father filed suit in Texas federal court to enjoin the Louisi-
ana court, which thereafter abstained voluntarily pending the federal deci-
sion. The federal district court accepted jurisdiction and issued the
injunction, from which the mother appealed."I 0 On appeal the Fifth Circuit
held that the district court had jurisdiction to enforce the child custody juris-
104. The state remedy is provided under State Bar Admission Rule XI(k), cited in Thomas,
748 F.2d at 280 n.5.
105. The alleged conspiracy was based entirely in California. There were no allegations of
the conspiracy reaching into Texas, other than by the law school's response to Thomas's re-
quest for degree confirmation and fitness comments. 748 F.2d at 282.
106. The trial court dismissed the action against the Texas defendants for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, the the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 279-82.
107. Id. at 282-83.
108. Primary family law jurisdictional statutes are 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (1982) (providing state
jurisdiction over military retirement benefits in the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Pro-
tection Act, hereinafter "FSPA"); 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982) (Federal Parental Kidnaping Pre-
vention Act, hereinafter "PKPA"); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.26 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (long-
arm divorce jurisdiction); id. §§ 11.51-.75 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1986) (Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act, hereinafter "UCCJA").
109. 749 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir. 1985).
110. Id. at 1139-40.
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diction standards of the federal parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 1 and
that the Act gave Texas exclusive jurisdiction over child support and visita-
tion as long as the father remained in Texas. 112 The district court lacked
jurisdiction, however, to enjoin the Louisiana court because the Louisiana
court had not yet acted. 113
Although federal law has been available to protect parents from constant
relitigation in other states since the Act's implementation in 198 1, many fed-
eral courts have been unwilling to enforce the Act because of the traditional
federal abstention from family law. The Fifth Circuit's holding in Heartfield
signals a change in federal court involvement in interstate child custody
cases.
In Soto-Ruphuy v. Yates' 1 4 the San Antonio Court of Appeals enjoined the
trial judge from assuming modification jurisdiction where the child and
mother have a new home state, even though that same Texas court had
granted the divorce. This holding rests on section 11.53(a)(2) of the Texas
Family Code, which also provided the basis of a Colorado decision that
Texas lacked child custody jurisdiction under Texas law, and that Colorado
therefore had an unchallenged claim of jurisdiction. 15
Lundell v. Clawson 1 6 is a Minnesota father's mandamus action against a
Texas trial judge for the immediate habeas corpus enforcement of a Minne-
sota custody order. The Texas-residing mother had originally been awarded
custody in a Minnesota divorce. She thereafter decided to move to Texas,
and petitioned the Minnesota court for permission to take the child to Texas,
which the court granted on May 26, 1983. In June, 1983, the mother moved
to Texas and left the two children with the father in Minnesota for the fa-
ther's two week summer vacation. The father kept the children beyond the
two week period, and on July 1, 1983, filed a Minnesota action to modify
custody. Upon the Minnesota court's interim order the father delivered the
children to the mother in Texas. Upon final hearing in Minnesota the father
won custody of the older child, and the mother was awarded custody of the
younger child. Both appealed, and the Minnesota appellate court awarded
both children to the father. The mother did not appeal to the Minnesota
Supreme Court, but instead immediately filed a new action in Minnesota for
custody, which she lost. The father then filed a Texas habeas corpus action
for custody of the younger child. In that Texas habeas action the mother
cross-petitioned for custody of the younger child. The Texas trial court de-
nied habeas to the father, granted the mother temporary custody, and as-
sumed jurisdiction over the child on the emergency ground that the child
wanted to remain with the mother in Texas. The father then filed a manda-
mus action against the trial judge regarding the habeas relief, which he won
in regard to his right to immediate custody based on the Minnesota custody
111. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982).
112. 749 F.2d at 1141-42.
113. Id. at 1143.
114. 687 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ).
115. Dunn v. Franklin, 701 P.2d 158 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985).
116. 697 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, no writ).
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award enforceable in Texas under the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act' 17
and the Texas Family Code. I 8
The habeas award to the father was merely temporary relief, however.
The court of appeals noted that the mother was entitled to litigate the matter
of Texas child custody jurisdiction if she could show that Minnesota had lost
or declined jurisdiction since the 1983 Minnesota custody orders. In so
holding the court of appeals rejected the mother's two jurisdictional argu-
ments. The mother first argued that by permitting her to take the children
to Texas, Minnesota declined jurisdiction. The court observed that this is
not necessarily true since Minnesota could keep jurisdiction as long as the
father remained in Minnesota, and as long as the Minnesota court elected to
exercise jurisdiction.'1 9 The mother then argued that the facts compelled
Texas to assume emergency jurisdiction. The court, however, held that alle-
gations that the child wanted to remain in Texas did not establish emergency
jurisdiction, even though the child's wishes might ultimately be heeded by
the state with continuing jurisdiction, which, if not Minnesota, was Texas. 120
In Bolger v. Bolger12' a Texas court of appeals denied Texas child custody
jurisdiction in a divorce because a New York court had assumed jurisdic-
tion. The Texas court held that because Texas was not the children's home
state (the father had them temporarily in Texas for a visit when he filed the
divorce and custody action), Texas could not assume jurisdiction if the home
state, New York, elected to do so.1 22 This was true even though the father
filed the Texas action first. The father also objected to the enforcement of
the New York custody order because it was not final. The court of appeals
held that under the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act all custody deter-
minations, including temporary ones, are equally enforceable. 123
Williams v. Knott124 considered jurisdiction for termination of nonresident
parental rights. The father and mother were divorced in Oklahoma in 1979
and the mother moved to Texas and remarried. The mother's new husband
sought to adopt the mother's child, which required the termination of the
father's parental rights. The mother sued the father in Texas to terminate
his parental rights based on the father's not having paid child support for
one year. The father argued that Texas could not assume jurisdiction over
this issue because of Oklahoma's continuing child custody jurisdiction under
the PKPA.
The Austin Court of Appeals held that the PKPA did not apply to this
parental termination action because it was not a child custody determina-
tion. 125 The father also challenged the Texas court's personal jurisdiction
117. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982).
118. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 11.63, 11.64(a) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1986).
119. 697 S.W.2d at 839-40.
120. Id. at 840-41.
121. 678 S.W.2d 194, 196 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 197.
124. 690 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, no writ).
125. Id. at 608-09.
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over him, citing Shaffer v. Heitner126 and Kulko v. Superior Court.127 The
Texas court acknowledged that the father might not have minimum contacts
with Texas, but pointed out that not all assertions of jurisdiction require
minimum contacts.' 28 The court noted that status adjudications like cus-
tody are governed by special jurisdiction principles. 129 The court cited Perry
v. Ponder130 as authority that Texas did not need personal jurisdiction over
the nonresident parent in a child custody case. Analogizing Perry's child
custody jurisdiction holding to the instant parental termination case, the
court noted that little authority existed as to whether parental terminations
required personal jurisdiction over the nonresident parent. The court noted,
however, that the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws provides that
parental termination is a status proceeding that does not require personal
jurisdiction. 131 Thus the father was compelled to defend his parental rights
in Texas, but his litigation on the merits fared better. The court of appeals
denied the mother's request, holding that she failed to show that the termi-
nation was in the best interest of the child or that the father had willfully
evaded his support payments.
Three other cases addressed miscellaneous jurisdictional issues. Irving v.
Irving132 involved a three-year divorce action with conflicting Illinois and
Texas custody awards. The final contest occurred in Texas where the Illi-
nois resident mother sought enforcement of her Illinois custody order and
the return of her two children who were brought to Texas by the father four
days before his Texas filing. 133 The mother and the Illinois decree eventually
won because Illinois was the children's home state at the time of the father's
Texas filing, 134 thus denying Texas jurisdiction under section 11.53 of the
126. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
127. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
128. 690 S.W.2d at 606.
129. Id.
130. 604 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).
131. 690 S.W.2d at 607. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 69-79
(1971).
132. 682 S.W.2d 718 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, writ dism'd).
133. At the time of Texas filing, the father had lived in Texas only four months and twenty-
seven days. The six-month residency requirement of TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.21 (Vernon
1975) is not jurisdictional, however, and such cases are litigable unless timely challenged.
134. Irving's home state jurisdictional standard is from the UCCJA, which was adopted in
Texas after Irving's filing but before trial. Most courts faced with this retroactivity question
have applied the UCCJA to already-filed case. See, e.g., In re Potts, 83 I11. App. 3d 518, 404
N.E.2d 446, 450 (1980) (lower court ruling vacated in light of enactment of Act); Johnson v.
Melback, 5 Kan. App. 2d 69, 612 P.2d 188, 194-95 (1980) (jurisdiction denied on the basis of
Act); Elliott v. Elliott, 612 S.W.2d 889, 892-93 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (procedural nature of
statute permits retroactive application); Wenz v. Schwartze, 598 S.W.2d 1086, 1093 (Mont.
1979) (to uphold judgment rendered prior to Act the facts must meet the jurisdictional stan-
dards of Act), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1071 (1980); In re William L., 99 Misc. 2d 346, 416
N.Y.S.2d 477, 484-85 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1979) (retroactivity permitted because statute is proce-
dural or, alternatively, reflects law prior to enactment); Tuttle v. Henderson, 628 P.2d 1275,
1276 n.7 (Utah 1981) (Act is persuasive authority as to state of law prior to enactment). Other
courts have declined rectroactive application, see Wilke v. Wilke, 73 A.D.2d 915, 423
N.Y.S.2d 249, 252 (1980); Pitrowski v. Pitrowski, 97 Misc. 2d 755, 412 N.Y.S.2d 316, 320-21
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979). See generally O'Daniel, Retroactivity and Judicial Adoption, in INTER-
STATE CHILD CUSTODY DISPUTES AND PARENTAL KIDNAPPING: POLICY, PRACTICE AND
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Family Code. 135 Seeley v. Seeley 136 held that FSPA jurisdiction was satisfied
when the military husband made a special appearance to challenge jurisdic-
tion, then allowed the court to proceed without ruling on his jurisdictional
challenge. In so doing, he entered a general appearance and satisfied the
jurisdiction by consent section of the FSPA.137
Deanne v. Deannet38 involved a Texas default judgment against a military
husband stationed in Germany. The husband appealed based on lack of no-
tice. The trial court had proceeded on the wife's assurance that the husband
had actual notice of the action, even though the court record did not show
that notice was legally made. The court of appeals upheld the husband's
challenge, ruling that notice must comply with Texas law and remanding for
trial. 139
B. Notice
Service of process, the constitutional notice requirement, is an essential
element of judicial jurisdiction apart from the forum's territorial contacts
with the defendant. Service of process must satisfy both forum law and fed-
eral constitutional standards to establish jurisdiction. Described another
way, the exercise of judicial jurisdiction requires (1) the defendant's amena-
bility to service based on minimum contacts with the forum, and (2) the
valid execution of service. Failure of the first element results in a dismissal,
but, contrary to a line of appellate holdings, failure of the second does not.
In its per curiam ruling in Kawasaki 11 40 the Texas Supreme Court clarified
the ramifications of defective service. The court held in Kawasaki II that
(1) Texas had constitutionally-sufficient contacts with the Japan-based de-
fendant under the stream of commerce doctrine, and (2) Kawasaki had sub-
mitted to Texas jurisdiction in its special appearance by contesting the
manner of service.' 4 ' This second ruling does not represent new law in
Texas, but will seem so to many courts and advocates who have subscribed
to a long line of Texas cases holding that a defendant may argue defective
service of process in a special appearance. 142
LAW 12-1 (1982). Even if the Irving court had not applied the UCCJA retroactively, Texas
would have lacked jurisdiction because the UCCJA's Texas predecessor gave jurisdictional
priority to the child's principle residence, which for Irving was Illinois. See 682 S.W.2d at 721.
135. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.53 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1986).
136. 690 S.W.2d 626 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, no writ).
137, See 10 U.S.C.A. § 1408(c)(4)(C) (West 1983). The FSPA has three bases of jurisdic-
tion over military retirement benefits for divorce property settlements, all based on the forum
state's relationship to the military spouse. They are: (a) jurisdiction by residence, other than
by military assignment, in the territorial jurisdiction of the court, (b) jurisdiction by domicile
in the territorial jurisdiction of the court, and (c) jurisdiction by consent. See id. at
§ 1408(c)(4)(A)-(C).
138. 689 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. App.-Waco 1985, no writ).
139. Id. at 263.
140. 699 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. 1985).
141. See Kawasaki II discussion, supra notes 8-26 and accompanying text.
142. See TM Prods. v. Blue Mountain Broadcasting, 623 S.W.2d 427, 431-32 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.); In re D.N.S., 592 S.W.2d 35, 37 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beau-
mont 1979, no wirt).
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A special appearance is a procedural device for contesting judicial juris-
diction and is governed in Texas by Rule 120a of the Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. 43 Defendant Kawasaki entered a Rule 120a special appearance and
argued that it lacked sufficient contacts with Texas. Furthermore, the de-
fendant argued, even if those contacts existed, jurisdiction was defective be-
cause Middleton had incorrectly alleged that Mr. Tomita was Kawasaki's
registered Texas agent in 1979, and thus service on Tomita was insufficient
under Texas law. 144
The Texas Supreme Court noted that the sole purpose of a Rule 120a
hearing is for the defendant to argue that he is not amenable to service of
process,' 45 that is, that the contacts are insufficient for jurisdiction. When
Kawasaki also challenged the manner of service, the court stated, it ex-
ceeded the scope of a Rule 120a hearing and thereby entered a general ap-
pearance. Manner of service of process is a curable defect and must be
challenged in a motion to quash service, which is done in a general appear-
ance. 146 If a defendant succeeds in quashing service, the court noted, the
only advantage gained is additional time to answer. 147
In thus clarifying the law, the supreme court noted contrary rulings by
numerous Texas courts of appeals, all holding that a defendant may raise
curable defects in a Rule 120a special appearance, and if successful, have the
case dismissed. 14s According to Kawasaki II those decisions are wrong.
The court's clarification of curable defects in jurisdictional pleading and ser-
vice brings Texas state courts into line with federal practice in this area. The
court applied Kawasaki II's ruling on defective service in a per curiam opin-
ion in Wheat v. Toone, 149 holding that plaintiff's defective jurisdictional alle-
gations were curable defects that required additional time to amend and not
a dismissal.' 5 0
In addition to Kawasaki II's clarification of Rule 120a practice, several
1985 cases reaffirmed basic rules for service of process on nonresidents.
These rules are sufficiently evasive without periodic review. Such rules in-
clude the need for a properly worded citation showing manner of service, 15 1
strict pleading compliance for substituted service, 15 2 and diligence in at-
tempting to serve the registered agent before qualifying for substituted
143. TEX. R. CIv. P. 120a.
144. 699 S.W.2d at 200, 201-03. Middleton did not attempt 2031b long-arm service on
Kawasaki apparently because he believed that Kawasaki was amenable to local service
through Mr. Tomita in Houston. Id.
145. Id. at 201-02.
146. Id. at 202.
147. Id. This occurs because once the defendant has moved to quash service, he has entered
a general appearance and answer time begins to run.
148. Id.
149. 29 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 101 (Dec. 11, 1985).
150. Id. at 101.
151. Cox Mktg., Inc. v. Adams, 688 S.W.2d 215, 217 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1985, no writ).
152. See McGuffy Co. v. Perfected Indus. Prods., 683 S.W.2d 781, 782 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ); Public Storage Properties, VII v. Rankin, 678 S.W.2d 590, 592
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ).
[Vol. 40
CONFLICT OF LAWS
service. 153
C. Inconvenient Forum
Forum non conveniens is a conflict of laws doctrine stating that otherwise
valid jurisdiction should not be exercised if the forum is seriously inconve-
nient for litigation, provided that a more appropriate forum is available to
the plaintiff. 1 5 4
In Gannon v. Payne155 the Dallas Court of Appeals initially affirmed the
defendant's forum non conveniens argument, then reversed on rehearing.
Gannon and Payne were partners in an oil and gas lease in Canada which
began in 1965. Sometime after 1971 Gannon unilaterally reduced Payne's
share of the mineral proceeds with the explanation that Payne had a "free
ride" while Gannon did all the work. Payne disagreed with the reduction
and sued Gannon in Canada. Payne prevailed on most of his claims against
Gannon but lost on others. Gannon appealed the Canadian results and lost.
Payne, a Texan, did not appeal in Canada.
In 1982 Payne sued Gannon in Texas, seeking recovery of the damages
denied in Canada, as well as other relief.15 6 Gannon responded by filing his
answer and counterclaim to the Texas action, and by filing a declaratory
judgment action in Canada seeking to interfere with the Texas court's juris-
diction. Payne moved to have the Texas court enjoin Gannon, who had
submitted himself to Texas jurisdiction, from pursuing the Canadian declar-
atory judgment action. Gannon objected to Payne's motion on the grounds
that the Texas litigation was burdensome on Gannon (forum non con-
veniens), that comity required the Texas court's deference to the Canadian
action, and that res judicata from the earlier Canadian action barred Payne's
Texas claims. The trial court overruled Gannon's objections and enjoined
him from pursuing the Canadian declaratory judgment action. 157 Gannon
appealed and the court of appeals ruled that the trial court abused its discre-
tion in issuing the injunction against Gannon. Upon rehearing, however, the
court of appeals reversed itself, holding that the trial court had not abused
its discretion because (1) the burden on Gannon of litigation in Texas was
not disproportionately greater than the burden on Payne of litigation in Can-
ada,'5 8 (2) comity was a matter of judicial discretion not a matter of right,' 59
153. Bilek & Purcell Indus. v. Paderwerk Gebr. Benteler GmbH & Co., 694 S.W.2d 225,
226 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ). See also Delta S.S. Lines v. Albano, 768
F.2d 728, 730 (5th Cir. 1985) (service rules in federal diversity cases).
154. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 84 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as RESTATEMENT]. In general, forum non conveniens is unavailable in purely Texas actions in
which all parties are Texas residents and Texas law controls. See Couch v. Chevron Int'l Oil
Co., 672 S.W.2d 16, 18 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ); Cherokee Village v.
Henderson, 538 S.W.2d 169, 174-75 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, writ dism'd).
155. No. 05-84-00826-CV (Tex. App.-Dallas, April 26, 1985), withdrawn on rehearing,
695 S.W.2d 741 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ granted).
156. 695 S.W.2d at 743.
157. Id. at 743. The text of the trial court's injunction against Gannon is set out in an
appendix to the appellate opinion, id. at 745-47.
158. Id. at 744-45.
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and (3) the court could not consider res judicata in this interlocutory order
because it went to the merits of the claim. 160
Justice Akin dissented, arguing that Gannon should not be enjoined be-
cause Payne had failed to establish a probability of victory on the merits due
to the res judicata effect of the Canadian judgment. 16 1 Justice Akin further
contended that forum non conveniens principles required deference to the
more convenient Canadian court where the better evidence existed. 162 Fi-
nally, Justice Akin argued, comity called for deference to the Canadian
courts judgment.163
Any in-depth analysis of Gannon is beyond the scope of this Survey. Fur-
ther analysis would require familiarity with the voluminous facts and issues
from the initial Canadian litigation. 164 Litigators, however, should review
the Gannon opinions for the Dallas court of appeals' analysis of forum non
conveniens and simultaneous foreign litigation.
D. Sovereign Immunity
Sovereign immunity is frequently ignored as a component of conflict of
laws. The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws provides that "[a] state
will not exercise judicial jurisdiction when inaction on its part is required by
international law or by the needs of judicial administration."' 165 Sovereign
immunity is a customary 166 rule of international law requiring inaction by
courts in protection of diplomatic personnel and foreign governmental agen-
cies engaged in noncommercial activities. The United States has codified
this international rule in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.167 The ear-
lier customary rules were binding as federal common law. 168
Texas courts produced two cases during the Survey period turning on sov-
ereign immunity. In Brazosport Towing Company v. 3838 Tons of Sor-
ghum 16 9 a Mexican government agency, Conasupo,' 70 contracted with
Flumgo, S.A., a private Mexican corporation, for the shipment of sorghum
from Texas to Mexico. Although the Conasupo/Flumgo contract was not
assignable, Flumgo assigned its duties to Brazosport who shipped the sor-
159. Id. at 744. See infra notes 194-207 and accompanying text for further discussion of
comity in Gannon.
160. Id. at 744.
161. Id. at 749 (Akin, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 750-51.
163. Id. at 751.
164. Id. at 742 n. 1.
165. RESTATEMENT, supra note 154, at § 83. See comments following section 83 for exam-
ples of sovereign immunity, as well as the needs of judicial administration.
166. Custom, defined as general practice accepted as law, is a principle source of interna-
tional law. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 102(l)(a), (2) (Tent. Draft 1985).
167. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1982).
168. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 131 (Tent. Draft 1985), and reporters'
notes following.
169. 607 F. Supp. 11 (S.D. Tex. 1984).
170. Compania Nacional de Subsistencias Populares.
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ghum to Mexico. Conasupo refused to accept or pay for the shipment and
returned the sorghum to the United States. Brazosport then sought payment
of freight charges from Conasupo by suing in federal district court in Gal-
veston. Conasupo failed to answer or notify the court that it was a foreign
government agency, and the court issued a default judgment.
Upon Conasupo's application for relief from the default judgment, the
court granted it sovereign immunity because Conasupo had no contact with
the United States other than having its sorghum returned here.17 1 The court
noted that the underlying contract for shipment was between Conasupo and
Flumgo, both Mexican entities. Moreover, the parties negotiated and signed
the shipment contract in Mexico with a Mexican choice of law clause. 17 2
The court therefore held that this did not constitute commercial activity by
the Mexican government 73 and thus the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
protected Conasupo. 174
Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A. 175 involved a breach of contract and securities
action against a Mexican bank for paying off certificates of deposit in deval-
ued pesos instead of the contracted-for United States dollars. Bancomer did
so in compliance with a Mexican law that mandated all deposits in Mexican
banks be paid out in pesos, no matter what the designation of the currency.
The plaintiffs were Dallas residents who purchased four Bancomer certifi-
cates of deposit worth a total of $300,000. The certificates were denomi-
nated and payable in United States dollars upon three months' maturity.
One month after the purchase Mexico nationalized its banks and decreed
that obligations formerly payable in United States dollars would now be paid
in the plunging pesos. 17 6 The Callejos sued for breach of contract in state
district court in Dallas. Bancomer removed the action to federal district
court 17 7 and the Callejos amended their claim to allege state and federal
securities violations.178
Bancomer, now part of the Mexican government, moved to dismiss under
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the district court complied. 179
The Fifth Circuit disagreed that sovereign immunity applied but upheld the
dismissal on different grounds.' 8 0 The court held that the bank was not
immune because its actions constituted commercial activities not covered by
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.' 8 ' The Callejos' lawsuit was none-
theless barred by the act of state doctrine, which in effect is a choice of law
171. 607 F. Supp. at 15.
172. Id. at 13.
173. Id. at 15.
174. Id.
175. 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985).
176. The Mexican laws and regulations were issued in August and September, 1982. Id. at
1106.
177. Removal authority was 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1982), relating to suits against an
"agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" as defined by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (1982). See 764 F.2d at 1106 n.3.
178. See 764 F.2d at 1106 n.4 for cites to the alleged securities violations.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1125-26.
181. Id. at 1106-12.
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rule requiring that courts apply foreign law to appropriate issues in the
case. 182 The application of Mexican law resulted in the payment-in-pesos
law superseding the Callejos' contracts with Bancomer, thus absolving
Bancomer for breach of contract liability. 183
Callejo contains excellent discussions of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act and the act of state doctrine.1 8 4 In particular, Callejo explores the act of
state doctrine's exceptions. These exceptions include commercial activi-
ties, 185 contrary treaty obligations, 186 and the situs of the deposit as compel-
ling the application of foreign rather than Texas law.187
Finally, Zernicek v. Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex)' 8s was a personal injury
action in Texas state court against Pemex, a Mexican government agency,
for radiation sickness suffered by a United States citizen working in Mexico.
Pemex removed to federal district court and asked for dismissal on sovereign
immunity grounds. Zernicek argued that Pemex had waived sovereign im-
munity when it allowed prime contractor Corporacion de Construciones de
Campeche (CCC) to make a subcontract with Brown and Root that included
a Texas choice of law clause for any claims based on the parties' acts or
omissions. The court held that waivers of sovereign immunity are narrowly
construed and must be based on strong evidence of the foreign government's
intent to waive immunity.189 The court found the CCC contract with
Brown and Root insufficient to waive Pemex's immunity for a personal in-
jury lawsuit by an alleged third party beneficiary to that contract. 190 The
court also rejected Zernicek's argument that the United States had jurisdic-
tion under the effects test of the FSIA, 19 1 because of the ongoing effects Zer-
nicek would experience in the United States from the radiation sickness. 192
The court held that even though radiation sickness may be an ongoing in-
jury, the original injury was sufficiently localized in Mexico to invalidate the
jurisdiction-by-effects argument. 193
182. Id. at 1112-25. Although the Act of State doctrine is said to operate as a choice of law
rule, see RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 469, Reporters' Note 1 (Tent. Draft 1985); L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER, H. SMIT,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 133-34 (1980), its purpose is to deny courts the judicial jurisdiction to
review the sovereign acts of a foreign government within its own territory, even if those acts
had transnational effects.
183. That is, if the court applied Texas law to the Callejos' claims as they requested,
Bancomer might be held liable. If the court applied Mexican contract law to the breach, but
did not apply the bank nationalization decree, again Bancomer might be found liable. By
requiring the application of all pertinent Mexican law, Bancomer is given the benefit of the
Mexican nationalization decree it was forced to obey.
184. 764 F.2d at 1106-25.
185. Id. at 1114-16.
186. Id. at 1116-21.
187. Id. at 1121-25.
188. 614 F. Supp. 407 (S.D. Tex. 1985).
189. Id. at 411.
190. Id. at 411-12.
191. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1982), discussed in 614 F. Supp. at 412-13.
192. 614 F. Supp. at 412-13.
193. Id. at 413.
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E. Comity
A nonbinding custom of international law suggesting restraint in judicial
jurisdiction is comity, the international attempt at full faith and credit.1 94
Comity applies to foreign acts, both legislative and judicial; in this sense,
"foreign" means sister states as well as other nations. The instant discussion
relates only to comity's role in encouraging Texas courts to refrain from
exercising judicial jurisdiction in deference to non-Texas courts. The "For-
eign Judgments" section below will briefly mention comity as it applies to
the recognition of foreign judgments.195
Comity is a weak legal doctrine and has never been reliable as an advo-
cate's tool, although it has given many judges a nail on which to hang their
decisions. Two reasons for comity's weakness exist. First, it is non-bind-
ing,196 designed merely to promote friendly relations between sovereigns and
not to protect litigants' rights. Second, a barrage of criticism has been aimed
at comity for many years, both on theoretical 197 and practical grounds. 198
The omission from the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, 199 and a
brief reference in the drafts of the Revised Restatement of the Foreign Rela-
tions Law of the United States reflect comity's legal weakness and
disfavor. z° °
In spite of its bad reputation, comity manages a few mentions each year in
Texas cases. In 1985 a Houston appellate court held in InterFirst Bank-
Houston v. Quintana Petroleum20 1 that the trial court did not abuse its dis-
cretion in dismissing counterclaims against the trustees of a Louisiana-based
trust. The court based the dismissal on comity to a Louisiana court that was
194. Some will disagree with the equating of comity with full faith and credit. The latter is
a binding rule, the former is not. The two are similar, however, in that (1) both seek the
forum's recognition of foreign law and judgments, and (2) both have underlying theories of
political good will and respect for the judicial acts of other governments. But as explained in
notes 197-98 infra, comity's judicial validity is questionable.
195. See infra text accompanying notes 311-402.
196. But see I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 31 (3d ed.
1979) (stating that certain aspects of comity may ripen into binding law).
197. Critics argue that comity's underlying theory is political, designed to promote cooper-
ation between sovereigns. Thus, comity is an executive doctrine and not a judicial one. See G.
CHESHIRE and P. NORTH, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (10th ed. 1979) (hereinafter
cited as CHESHIRE).
198. Comity is entirely discretionary, leading to arbitrary judicial applications and erratic
precedents. The early American conflicts scholar, Samuel Livermore, described comity as "a
phrase which is grating to the ear, when it proceeds from a court of justice." De Nova, The
First American Book on Conflict of Laws, 8 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 136, 141 (1964). Cheshire
says of comity, "The term is, indeed, frequently found in English writing and judgments, but
on analysis it will be found to be either meaningless or misleading." CHESHIRE, supra note
197, at 4. See also E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 12-16 (1982) (tracing develop-
ment and criticism of comity in America); R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, CONFLICT OF
LAWS 1-8 (3d ed. 1981) (brief history of choice of law).
199. RESTATEMENT, supra note 154, fails to mention comity in section 83 (concerning
limits on judicial jurisdiction imposed by international law), section 86 (pendency of foreign
actions), or section 98 (recognition of foreign judgments).
200. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 491, reporters' note 1 (Tent. Draft 1985).
201. 699 S.W.2d 864 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ).
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litigating the same matter, and on the Louisiana court's more effective rem-
edy in its exclusive power to dismiss the trustee.
Another Texas comity case, Gannon v. Payne,20 2 was discussed in the In-
convenient Forum section above.20 3 Gannon held that comity was not a mat-
ter of right, but of deference and courtesy within the trial court's
discretion-a standard invocation when courts consider comity. The trial
court rejected the comity argument.20 4 The court of appeals reversed, rely-
ing partly on comity in agreeing with the defendant that he should not be
enjoined from pursuing simultaneous litigation in Canada. 20 5 Upon rehear-
ing, however,the court reversed itself and deferred to the trial court's discre-
tion in rejecting comity. The court upheld the trial court's injunction
against the defendant pursuing the Canadian litigation,20 6 with Justice
Akin's dissent that comity to Canada was appropriate.20 7 Gannon's discus-
sion of comity does not warrant further comment here, but its analysis of a
Texas court's obligation in the face of simultaneous foreign litigation is
noteworthy.
II. CHOICE OF LAW
In Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co. 20 8 the Texas Supreme Court rejected the
choice of law analysis traditionally applied by Texas courts in contracts
cases209 and held that the so-called "most significant relationship" test 21 0
would thereafter be applicable to all choice of law cases unless the parties
have agreed to a valid choice of law clause. 21' Decisions rendered by Texas
courts and by federal courts applying Texas law reported in late 1984 and in
1985 involving choice of law in the contractual context have applied the
Duncan rule several times. Unfortunately, the courts have not carefully ap-
plied the most significant relationship analysis. Under the Texas Supreme
Court's earlier decision in Gutierrez v. Collins, choice of law analysis in torts
cases212 also applies the most significant relationship test. This analysis has
202. No. 05-84-00826-CV (Tex. App.-Dallas, April 26, 1985), withdrawn on rehearing,
695 S.W.2d 741 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ granted).
203. See supra notes 155-64 and accompanying text.
204. 695 S.W.2d at 743, 745-47.
205. Id. at 742.
206. Id. at 744.
207. Id. at 747, 751.
208. 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984).
209. With respect to traditional Texas choice of law analysis, see Pedersen & Cox, Choice
of Law and Usury Limits Under Texas Law and the National Bank Act, 34 Sw. L.J. 755, 755-
87 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Pedersen and Cox].
210. RESTATEMENT, supra note 154, at § 6.
211. 665 S.W.2d at 421.
212. 583 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1979). Gutierrez involved a suit by a Texas plaintiff, Ms. Gu-
tierrez, against a Texas defendant, Mr. Collins, seeking damages for personal injuries suffered
in an automobile accident that occurred in Mexico. Under traditional Texas choice of law
principles, the law of the place where the wrong occurred, the lex loci delicti, would have been
applied to determine the rights of the parties. Accordingly, Mexican law would have applied.
The plaintiff prayed in the alternative for damages to be measured in accordance with one of
two sets of rules, ordinary Texas rules and rules of Mexican law. The defendant argued that
the case should be dismissed in accordance with the so-called dissimilarity doctrine, under
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not developed significantly in the 1984-1985 Survey period although a few
reported decisions have considered the choice of law issue in that context.
Duncan is the starting point for any analysis of Texas developments in
choice of law in the contractual context. In that case a Texas resident was
killed in an airplane crash that occurred in New Mexico. The family of the
decedent filed a wrongful death action against the owner of the airplane, Air
Plains West, Inc., and against the estate of the airplane's pilot, Benjamin
Smithson, who was also killed in the crash. The plaintiffs settled with Air
Plains West. In connection with the settlement the plaintiffs executed a re-
lease of the defendants and also "any other corporations or persons whomso-
ever responsible therefor, whether named herein or not,"'2 13 from any and all
claims on account of the injuries to and death of the plaintiffs' decedent.
The widows of the decedents thereafter brought wrongful death actions
against Cessna Aircraft Company alleging that certain purported design and
manufacturing defects caused their husbands' deaths. Cessna argued that
the Duncan family's release terminating the litigation against Air Plains
West and the estate of the pilot discharged Cessna from any liability. Cessna
based its argument upon New Mexico law, under which Cessna claimed the
release would have been so construed. Mrs. Duncan argued that the case
presented no true conflict of laws problem, because whichever law was appli-
cable, Cessna's argument should be rejected.
The trial court ruled New Mexico law applied. 2 14 The court of appeals,
which a Texas court will dismiss a case for lack of jurisdiction if the applicable foreign law is
"so different from ... [the laws] .. .of Texas as to make it impossible for a Texas court to
apply and enforce" it. Id. at 313. The trial court sustained the defendant's contention and
dismissed the case. The court of appeals affirmed. In analyzing which jurisdiction's law
should be applicable, the supreme court first rejected the defendant's argument that under
former article 4678, Act of June 19, 1975, ch. 530, § 2, 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws 1381, 1382,
repealed by Act of June 16, 1985, ch. 959, § 9, 1985 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 7043, 7218 (Vernon),
a portion of the Texas Wrongful Death Statute, the law of Mexico must be applied even in
cases involving a common law cause of action. The court then analyzed the modern trend in
many states away from the lex loci delicti rule and quoted approvingly from Professor Robert
Leflar's treatise to the effect that the Restatement, in section 6 and elsewhere throughout the
Restatement, "includes most of the substance of all the modern thinking on choice of law."
583 S.W.2d at 318 (quoting R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 139 (3d ed. 1977)).
The court held:
Having considered all of the theories, it is the holding of this court that in the
future all conflicts cases sounding in tort will be governed by the "most signifi-
cant relationship" test as enunciated in Sections 6 and 145 of the Restatement
(Second) of Conflicts. This methodology offers a rational yet flexible approach
to conflicts problems. It offers the courts some guidelines without being too
vague or too restrictive. It represents a collection of the best thinking on this
subject and does indeed include "most of the substance" of all the modern
theories.
Id.
Having so held, the court reversed the judgments of the lower courts and remanded the case
to the trial court for reconsideration of the choice of law issue. Id. at 319. In so doing the
court noted that Mexico's only contact with the case was the fact that the accident occurred
there and that it made "little sense to apply Mexico's measure of damages, which indexes the
amount of recovery to the prevailing wages set by the labor law of that nation, when both
Gutierrez and Collins are residents of Texas." Id. at 319.
213. 665 S.W.2d at 418.
214. Id. at 420.
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however, held that Texas law governed the construction of the release be-
cause the release was a contract executed in Texas and, in accordance with
established Texas law, the law of the place of making of a contract, the lex
loci contractus, applied to its construction. 21 5 On appeal to the supreme
court, both Cessna and Duncan argued that the rule of lex loci contractus
should not apply. They argued that the proper approach to this issue was
the most significant relationship methodology of the Restatement which the
Texas Supreme Court had adopted in Gutierrez for resolving choice of law
issues in tort cases. 21 6
In analyzing this issue the Texas Supreme Court found that most of the
inadequacies of the lex loci delicti rule were also present in the lex loci con-
tractus rule. According to the court, each of those rules promotes mechanis-
tic decision making at the expense of just and reasoned results.217 Thus the
supreme court held that in choice of law cases, except contract cases in
which the parties have agreed to a valid choice of law clause,218 the law of
the state with the most significant relationship 21 9 to the particular substan-
215. Numerous Texas decisions have applied the lex loci contractus rule that the law of the
place of contracting is applicable in construing a contract. Among those decisions are Austin
Bldg. Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 432 S.W.2d 697, 701 (Tex. 1968); Dugan v. Lewis,
79 Tex. 246, 253, 14 S.W. 1024, 1026 (1891); Andrews v. Hoxie, 5 Tex. 171, 187-88 (1849);
Crosby v. Huston, I Tex. 203, 231-32 (1847); Hill v. McDermot, Dallam 419 (Tex. 1841);
Taylor v. Leonard, 275 S.W. 134, 135 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1925, no writ). Several
decisions have also held that if the place of formation of the contract is other than the place of
performance, then the law of the latter jurisdiction will control on the theory that such is the
intent of the parties. See, e.g., Seiders v. Merchants' Life Ass'n, 93 Tex. 194, 199, 54 S.W. 753,
754 (1900) (circumstances must show that parties intended for the law of the state of formation
to apply); Conner & Walker v. Donnell, Lawson & Co., 55 Tex. 167, 173 (1881) (promissory
note that is usurious in New York but not in Texas is enforceable if the parties appear to have
intended to make it payable in Texas); Shreck v. Shreck, 32 Tex. 579, 587 (1870) (Mexican law
applied to a marriage entered into in Texas because the parties looked to performance in
Mexico).
216. 655 S.W.2d at 420.
217. Id. at 421.
218. Id. By its reference to a "valid choice of law clause," the supreme court affirmed the
efficacy of such clause but did not indicate what factors might render such a clause invalid.
The supreme court did not indicate whether other sections of the Restatement, e.g., RESTATE-
MENT, supra note 154, at § 187, entitled "Law of the State Chosen by the Parties," should be
considered in analyzing whether a particular choice of law would be enforced. In Gutierrez the
supreme court made specific reference not only to section 6 but also to id. § 145, which sets
forth contacts to be taken into account in applying section 6 in the torts context. In Duncan
the court made no reference to id. § 188, which lists the contacts to be taken into account in
applying section 6 in the context of a contracts matter. Whether this omission was deliberate
is not clear. Note, however, that the comments to section 6 refer to numerous other sections of
the Restatement and make it clear that the drafters of the Restatement did not intend for
section 6 to be read in a vacuum.
219. The Texas Supreme Court applied the most significant relationship test of the RE-
STATEMENT, supra note 154, at § 6, which provides:
CHOICE-OF-LAW PRINCIPLES
(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory direc-
tive of its own state on choice of law.
(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the
applicable rule of law include
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
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tive issue will apply to resolve that issue. 2 20
In applying the most significant relationship test to the facts of Duncan
the court noted that the number of contacts with the particular state would
not be determinative, but rather that the qualitative nature of the particular
contacts would determine the applicable law.22 1 The court reviewed the
contacts of the various parties with Texas, New Mexico, and Kansas, the
domicile of the defendant Cessna, and stated that identification of the poli-
cies or governmental interest of each state in the application of its rules is the
starting point for evaluating these contacts.2 22 According to the court, New
Mexico simply had no interest in applying its policies to cut off a Texas
resident's claim against a Kansas corporation. On the other hand, Texas
had an important interest in allowing Mrs. Duncan's action to proceed. 223
In addition the supreme court noted that the plaintiff could reasonably have
expected that Texas law would govern the effect on third parties of a settle-
ment agreement executed and negotiated in Texas. 224 Thus, a false conflict
existed since only one state, not two or more, had an interest in applying its
law, and the law of Texas, the only state with a true interest in the applica-
tion of its law, applied.225
A. Texas Cases
Recent decisions in Texas have continued to apply the most significant
relationship rule, although unfortunately the courts' analyses of the rule
have been scanty at best. In Cessna Finance Corp. v. Morrison22 6 a court of
appeals in Houston held, in a suit on a promissory note, that since the note
expressly provided for payment in Kansas, the laws of Kansas governed the
parties' substantive rights and liabilities. 227 In support of this conclusion the
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of
those states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
According to the Restatement, the list of factors is not exclusive. RESTATEMENT, supra note
133, at § 6 comment c.
220. 665 S.W.2d at 421.
221. Id. Thus, the court noted that: "[s]ome contacts are more important than others be-
cause they implicate state policies underlying the particular substantive issue." Id.
222. Id.
223. Although under New Mexico law the release in question would have been effective to
discharge Cessna, the court concluded that the New Mexico law "reflects policies of effectuat-
ing the intent of the parties to the release and of protecting New Mexico defendants". Id.
Since Cessna was a Kansas corporation, there was no "New Mexico defendant". Id. The
court apparently did not consider whether Cessna did business in New Mexico or, indeed,
whether Cessna had its principal operations there.
224. Id. at 422.
225. The supreme court's failure to analyze the interest of Kansas, the domicile of Cessna,
is interesting since Cessna "had not asserted any error in the trial court's application of New
Mexico law." 665 S..W.2d at 421 n.6.
226. 667 S.W.2d 580 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ).
227. 667 S.W.2d at 585.
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court cited Andrews v. Hoxie,228 an 1849 supreme court decision, and Wade
v. Darring,229 a court of appeals decision rendered ten years earlier. The
court simply held Duncan inapplicable. The court recognized that Duncan
set forth the controlling law for resolving the conflict issue in contract
cases. 230 The court refused, however, to believe the Texas Supreme Court
intended to extend this principle to negotiable instruments. 231 The reported
decision contains no analysis to support this conclusion. The court cited
Restatement section 214, comment (b), entitled "Obligations of Makers and
Acceptors. '232 That section states that the local law of the state designated
in the instrument as the place of payment determines the obligations of the
maker of a note with certain exceptions. 233 Comment (b) analyzes the val-
ues of certainty and predictability in the area of negotiable instruments and
states that only the stated place of payment is considered in selecting the
state whose local law governs the obligations of the maker or acceptor of a
negotiable instrument. In the case of other contracts a number of factors
and contacts are taken into account. 234 According to the Restatement,
therefore, the state of payment, if set forth in the instrument, will always
furnish the applicable law. 235
On its face the Morrison decision indicates that Duncan and the most sig-
nificant relationship analysis are irrelevant when a negotiable instrument
constitutes the subject of the lawsuit. On the other hand, if the court of
appeals relied upon Restatement section 214, it confirmed that all of the
Restatement's choice of law rules, not just section 6,236 apply in analyzing
choice of law issues in contracts matters. This analysis is not free from diffi-
culty; however, if the court actually applied the Restatement rules, it should
have analyzed Restatement section 203 in the context of the usury challenge
made by the plaintiff.237 All in all, Morrison provides uncertain authority
for any choice of law proposition but it has interesting possibilities.
Despite the lack of clarity in the choice of law analysis in Morrison, a
court of appeals in Houston recently followed that decision without addi-
tional analysis in Velde v. Swanson.238 In Velde the court had to determine
what law should govern in a lawsuit brought by a payee of five promissory
notes against the estate of the notes' maker. Execution of the notes occurred
228. 5 Tex. 171 (1849).
229. 511 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. Civ, App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ).
230. 667 S.W.2d at 585.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. RESTATEMENT, supra note 154, at § 214(1).
234. See id. §§ 187, 188.
235. Id. § 214 comment b.
236. See supra note 219.
237. RESTATEMENT, supra note 154, at § 203 states:
The validity of a contract will be sustained against the charge of usury if it
provides for a rate of interest that is permissible in a state to which the contract
has a substantial relationship and is not greatly in excess of the rate permitted by
the general usury law of the state of the otherwise applicable law under the rule
of § 188.
238. 679 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ).
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in Nebraska where the maker resided. The notes were payable on demand to
the payee in Nebraska. The critical issue in the case was whether the four
year statute of limitations under Texas law had been extended by certain
partial payments by the maker after the payee's claim would have otherwise
been barred by the statute of limitations. The plaintiff argued that under
Duncan Nebraska law should apply, while the defendant contended that
Duncan provided authority for application of Texas law. Relying upon the
decision in Morrison,239 the court held that since the notes in question were
executed in Nebraska and made payable to the plaintiff at her residence in
Nebraska, the laws of Nebraska should apply to govern the substantive
rights and liabilities of the parties. Notably absent from the decision was
any analysis of the competing policies listed in section 6 of the Restatement,
although in quoting Morrison the court also cited Restatement section 214,
comment (b).240 On its merits the Velde decision is probably correct if one
follows the rather tortuous route through Restatement sections 214, 188 and
6, but the lack of analysis is remarkable.
In Seth v. Seth241 the choice of law issue involved the validity of a mar-
riage. In 1957 Mohan Seth, an alien, married Saroj Seth (Saroj), also an
alien. In 1967 Mr. Seth was granted permanent resident alien status in the
United States. The decision does not indicate whether Saroj lived with him
in the United States. In 1975 Mr. Seth and Anuradha Mohan Seth
(Anuradha) converted to Islam and were married in Bombay, India in an
Islamic ceremony. Approximately a year and half later Mr. Seth divorced
Saroj in Kuwait according to Islamic law. The next day Mr. Seth and
Anuradha were married again in another Moslem ceremony. Approxi-
mately one year later Anuradha was granted permanent resident alien status
in the United States as the wife of Mr. Seth. In 1982 Anuradha filed a peti-
tion for divorce in Dallas County and named Mr. Seth as respondent. Saroj
then filed plea in intervention, alleging that she was the lawful wife of Mr.
Seth and that Anuradha was never lawfully married to him. Mr. Seth and
Saroj basically denied all factual assertions made by Anuradha including the
assertion that the divorce and marriage ceremonies occurred in India and
Kuwait. The trial court applied Texas law to resolve the several issues
raised by the marriage and divorce ceremonies which the court held had
occurred in Kuwait and India.
On appeal, the court of appeals held that while traditionally courts have
utilized the law of the place of a divorce or marriage to determine validity,
Duncan required that choice of law decisions, even in divorce cases, should
be made on the basis of the most significant relationship approach using the
factors set forth in the section 6 of the Restatement. 242 Without explaining
its analysis, the court of appeals held that on the basis of Duncan and Guiter-
rez the criteria of section 6 and not the place of celebration test traditionally
239. See supra note 226.
240. 679 S.W.2d at 629.
241. 694 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, no writ).
242. Id. at 462.
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applied by Texas courts24 3 should apply to determine the applicable law in a
marriage or a divorce context. 244  Also, according to the court the most
critical consideration in analyzing section 6 of the Restatement in the di-
vorce and marriage context is the policy of the forum.
The court appeared most concerned that although Islamic law apparently
allowed a non-Moslem man to convert to Islam by pronouncing a short
phrase and then to divorce his wife through an ex parte procedure, "[t]he
harshness of such a result to the non-Muslim divorced wife runs so counter
to our notions of good morals and natural justice that ... Islamic law in this
situation need not be applied. '245 The court held that the other factors
listed in section 6 of the Restatement, including (1) the needs of the inter-
state and international systems, (2) the relevant policies of other interested
states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the
particular issue, (3) the protection of justified expectations, (4) the basic poli-
cies underlying the particular field of law, (5) certainty, predictability, and
uniformity of result, and (6) ease in the determination and the application of
the law to be applied, were simply not important to the context of the partic-
ular facts of the Seth case. 246 In other words, good morals and natural jus-
tice prevailed over the factors described in section 6 of the Restatement.247
Interestingly, the Seth court ignored sections 283 and 285 of the Restate-
ment. These sections specifically deal with the law governing the validity of
marriage and the right to a divorce. Section 283(1) of the Restatement states
that the validity of a marriage will be determined by the local law of the state
that, with respect to the particular issue, has the most significant relationship
to the spouses and the marriage under the principles set forth in section 6.248
That section also states, however, that a marriage that satisfies the require-
ments of the state where the marriage was contracted will be recognized as
valid everywhere unless it violates the strong public policy of another state
that had the most significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage at
the time of the marriage. Section 285 states that the local law of the domicil-
iary state in which the action is brought will apply in determining the right
243. See Braddock v. Taylor, 592 S.W.2d 40, 42 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (place of celebration determines validity of marriage); Nevarez v. Bailon, 287
S.W.2d 521, 522 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1956, writ refd) (party must show she was spouse
at the place of habitation to claim as heir of deceased).
244. 694 S.W.2d at 462.
245. Id. at 463.
246. Id. at 463-64.
247. Id. at 463.
248. Section 283 states:
VALIDITY OF MARRIAGE
(1) the validity of a marriage will be determined by the local law of the state
which, with respect to the particular issue, has the most significant relationship
to the spouses and the marriage under the principles stated in § 6.
(2) A marriage which satisfies the requirements of the state where the mar-
riage was contracted will everywhere be recognized as valid unless it violates the
strong public policy of another state which had the most significant relationship
to the spouses and the marriage at the time of the marriage.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283 (1971).
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to a divorce.249
If a Restatement-based analysis were performed in Seth, the decision
probably would have been the same. Comment (b) to section 283 notes that
the protection of the parties' justified expectations is of considerable impor-
tance in marriage.2 50 Thus, if the parties expected foreign law to apply and
under that law their marriage was valid, the parties expectations are entitled
to considerable weight. Even under section 283, however, if the marriage
violates a strong public policy of another state having the most significant
relationship to the spouses and the marriage, it may not be recognized as
valid although it is valid under the laws of the place of celebration. More-
over, under section 285 the domiciliary state, which would probably also be
the state having the most significant relationship to the parties and the mar-
riage, has the dominant interest in a person's marital status.25 1 If Mr. Seth
had lived in Texas for several years prior to the marriage, as was apparently
the case, Texas would have had an important interest in the marriage and its
purported termination. On the basis of that interest a Texas court might
have refused to enforce the foreign divorce. On the other hand, it is not
clear that Saroj lived in the United States at that time. If she did not, the
interest of Texas in the marriage would necessarily have been less. Even in
that situation, of course, under section 283 a Texas court could have de-
clined on public policy grounds to recognize the foreign marriage. Indeed,
the court arguably did just that in holding that the harshness of the divorce
militated against our notions of good morals and natural justice to such an
extent that Islamic law need not be applied.252
Another recent Texas decision applying the most significant relationship
test is Commercial Credit Equipment Corp. v. West.2 5 3 Commercial Credit
involved an action brought by buyers of an airplane against Commercial
Credit Equipment Corporation, assignee of a security agreement and prom-
issory note involved in the purchase. The plaintiffs argued that the contract
was usurious. The plaintiffs were Texas residents who had purchased the
aircraft from Denver Beechcraft, Inc., a corporation whose facilities were
located in Colorado. The promissory note and security agreement did not
contain choice of law clauses. Under Colorado law the contract would not
have been usurious although under Texas law it was usurious.254 The court
held that Texas had the most significant relationship to the particular sub-
stantive issue involved. The court did not analyze the factors listed in sec-
tion 6 of the Restatement, but simply concluded that the laws of Texas had
the most significant relationship to the particular substantive issue to be re-
solved in the case because the contract was executed in Texas and violated
249. Section 285 states that the "local law of the domiciliary state in which the action is
brought will be applied to determine the right to divorce." Id. § 285.
250. RESTATEMENT supra note 154, at § 283 comment b.
251. RESTATEMENT supra note 154, at § 285 comment a.
252. 694 S.W.2d at 463.
253. 677 S.W.2d 669 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
254. Id. at 672-73.
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the Texas statute.2 "5 Accordingly, Texas law applied. 256
In the written decision the court did not analyze any other factors which
could have had a bearing upon the most significant relationship test. For
example, under Restatement section 203 the validity of a contract should be
sustained against a usury challenge if the contract provides for a rate of in-
terest that is permissible in a state to which the contract has a substantial
relationship and that does not greatly exceed the rate permitted by the gen-
eral usury law of the state of the otherwise applicable law Under sections 6
and 188.257 Almost certainly, the contract in Commercial Credit had a sub-
stantial relationship to Colorado. Plaintiffs purchased the airplane from a
company located there and the collateral documents executed at the time of
purchase stated that the seller would assign the contract to Commercial
Credit Equipment Corporation. If the court had applied the Restatement's
rules, it could have determined that Colorado had the most significant rela-
tionship to the contract. Surely the parties expectations were that the con-
tract was not usurious, 258 and even if that were not the case, under section
203 Colorado law should have applied unless the rate of interest being
charged greatly exceeded the rate permissible in Texas.
Several federal decisions rendered during the Survey period have also con-
sidered various aspects of the choice of law issue under Texas law. In Life of
America Insurance Co. v. Aetna Life Insurance Co.259 the court examined
whether federal law precluded arbitration of a contract which provided for
arbitration and also provided that the laws of the state of Connecticut gov-
erned the agreement. 26° The court left the issue to the arbitrator but noted
that Life of America, the plaintiff-appellant, had not alleged that the choice
of law clause in the agreement was induced by fraud or overreaching, which
apparently would have negated its validity. 26 1 This decision is significant in
that it indicates again that courts will generally enforce express choices of
governing law in the absence of some overriding consideration to the
contrary. 262
In Webb v. Rodgers Machinery Manufacturing Co. 263 the plaintiff brought
a products liability action against the defendant for injuries sustained while
working on a machine manufactured by the defendant's predecessor, a pro-
prietorship that was thereafter incorporated. In analyzing the issue of
whether Texas law or California law should govern with respect to certain
issues in the case, the court referred to Gutierrez.264 The court noted that
under the Restatement a court should view choice of law considerations
255. Id. at 674.
256. Id.
257. RESTATEMENT, supra note 154, at § 203.
258. Under section 6 the expectations of the parties are of considerable significance. See
RESTATEMENT, supra note 154 at §§ 6(2)(d) comment g, 203 comment b.
259. 744 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1984).
260. Id, at 412.
261. Id.
262. See Pedersen & Cox, supra note 209, at 759-63.
263. 750 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1985).
264. 583 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1979).
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"with respect to the particular issue to be decided". 265 As to the issue of the
liability of a succeeding business entity using the trade name of a previously
existing proprietorship, the court noted that all contacts relevant to that is-
sue occurred in California.266 The corporation and proprietorships involved
in those transactions were all Californian. On that basis the court held that
California had the most significant relationship with respect to the issue of
whether the defendant corporation could be held liable for the torts of its
predecessor. The court further held that while California had a significant
interest in governing these relationships, Texas probably did not.267 Accord-
ingly, the court held that the district court did not err in applying California
law to govern that issue.268
Another decision involving Texas choice of law rules is Rosenberg v. Celo-
tex Corp. 269 This case involved a lawsuit brought by the wife of a shipyard
worker who had died after contracting asbestosis. The lawsuit was brought
against the manufacturer of the asbestos and certain other parties. The
plaintiff had originally brought an action in a New York state court which
had been dismissed on the basis of a New York statute of limitations. After
the death of the plaintiff's spouse, the plaintiff brought a wrongful death
action in federal district court in New York which was also dismissed. The
plaintiff subsequently filed a wrongful death action in federal district court in
Texas and the court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant
based on the prior New York decisions. The court, citing Gutierrez, held
that Texas conflict of laws rules mandated the application of New York sub-
stantive law to the case since New York had the most significant contacts. 270
Faloona v. Hustler Magazine, Inc. 271 is an invasion of privacy lawsuit
against Hustler Magazine for publishing nude pictures of children aged five
and seven. The photos were originally taken for use in "The Sex Atlas," a
reportedly academic study. The children's mother then signed releases au-
thorizing the photographer to use the pictures any way he saw fit. He saw fit
to sell them to Hustler. The children sued Hustler through their mother for
damages of $20 million. The court first considered which law applied to the
claims, dividing the choice of law analysis into (1) the children's right of
privacy (tort), and (2) the mother's release (contract). The court decided
that Texas law governed the right of privacy issues in accordance with Re-
statement section 145, the general tort choice of law principle which looks to
the contacts between the parties and the interested states.272 The court also
invoked Restatement section 153 "multistate invasion of privacy," which
gives priority to the plaintiffs' domicile at the time the injury occurred if the
matter complained of was published in the domiciliary state.273 The court
265. 750 F.2d at 374.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. 767 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1985).
270. Id. at 199.
271. 607 F. Supp. 1341 (N.D. Tex. 1985).
272. Id. at 1352.
273. Id.
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ruled that the Texas contacts were superior in that the plaintiffs and their
divorced parents all lived in Texas at the time the pictures appeared in Hus-
tler.274 Thus Texas law controlled the right of privacy. 275 The court de-
cided the contractual choice of law issue of the mother's release according to
Restatement section 188, the general contract choice of law principle. Again
Texas law won out because of superior contacts, particularly as to the domi-
cile of the plaintiffs and their parents at publication time. 276 After deciding
that Texas law controlled both the tort and contract issues, the court held
that the mother's release was valid in Texas and the children's privacy was
not invaded under alternative theories of presentation in a false light, public
exposure of private facts, or commercial appropriation. 277 The court but-
tressed its validation of the mother's release under Texas law by noting that
California law would also uphold the release. 278
The court's choice of law exercise here is more in depth than many recent
Texas choice of law decisions. In particular, Faloona's choice of law analysis
on the mother's release lists the place of contracting, the location of the
subject matter of the contract, the parties' reasonable expectations of which
law would apply, and the plaintiffs' domicile. Unfortunately, the court did
not pursue all of these factors in its subsequent analysis, but did consider the
plaintiffs' and parents' domicile and the place of the release's execution.279
Interestingly, the court summarized its argument for choosing Texas law
with the statement that Texas' superior contacts drawn from the Faloona
family's Texas domicile gave Texas a greater interest than California in gov-
erning the release's validity.280 This is an entirely appropriate argument, but
is curious as a conclusion in that comparative state interest is a distinct fac-
tor in the more basic most significant relationship test of section 6 of the
Restatement, which the court did not employ here even though it is the fo-
cus of the seminal Gutierrez281 and Duncan282 cases.
In Ritzmann v. Weekly World News 283 a Texan was injured by a national
publication's alleged defamation and invasion of her privacy. Plaintiff's es-
tranged husband scalded her with hot water, beat her, and tried to push her
onto the kitchen stove burners. When she fled, he set the house on fire and
died in the blaze. The incident was reported in the Dallas Times Herald, the
Dallas Morning News, and the Houston Post. Two months after the Texas
publications, the Florida based tabloid Weekly World News reported the
incident in an article entitled "Marriage Ends in Blazing Fury," in which
plaintiff alleged she was defamed and her privacy invaded. Without either
party raising a choice of law argument, and with plaintiff presumably plead-
274. Id.
275. See id.
276. Id. at 1353.
277. Id. at 1356-60.
278. Id. at 1355.
279. Id. at 1353.
280. Id.
281. 583 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1979).
282. 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984).
283. 614 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. Tex. 1985).
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ing under Texas law, the court considered choice of law sua sponte.2 84 Not-
ing that Texas applies the most significant relationship test, the federal court
followed sections 150(2) and 153 of the Restatement, governing respectively
multistate defamation and multistate invasion of privacy. 285 Both Restate-
ment sections give priority to the law of the state of plaintiff's domicile if the
matter was published in that state. 286 The court accordingly held that Texas
law governed even though the defendant's conduct took place in Florida.287
Applying Texas law, the court dismissed the defamation claim since all facts
were accurately taken from the Texas newspaper articles, but retained the
invasion of privacy claim for trial.288
B. Other Significant Cases
In a significant non-Texas case with important consequences to some
Texas mineral owners, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the con-
stitutional aspects of choice of law or, more appropriately, legislative juris-
diction. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts289 involved a class action by Shutts
and other royalty owners of Phillips' natural gas wells in eleven states. The
royalty owners sued Phillips in Kansas state court seeking interest on
delayed royalty payments. The resulting plaintiff class comprised some
28,000 royalty owners residing in all fifty states, the District of Columbia,
and several foreign countries. Over 99 percent of the gas wells and about 97
percent of the plaintiffs had no connection with Kansas other than the law-
suit. In spite of the minimal Kansas connections, the Kansas court applied
Kansas law to all claims, overruling Phillips' objection based on due process
and full faith and credit. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed.
On writ of certiorari the United States Supreme Court unanimously up-
held Kansas jurisdiction, but a majority of the Court reversed the Kansas
choice of law. 290 Justice Rehnquist's opinion held that the Constitution re-
quired that the Kansas forum have a "significant contact or aggregation of
284. A diligent search produced no authority forbidding a court from raising choice of law
on its own motion. It may have been unnecessary in Ritzmann, however. The court could
have reached the same result by employing any of several conflict of laws presumptions. For
example, forum law is presumed to apply unless the parties plead otherwise, see E. SCOLES &
P. HAY, supra note 198, at 412 n.3; parties who fail to plead and adequately prove foreign law
are presumed to acquiesce to forum law or, alternatively, to have chosen forum law, see id. at
413 n.10; forum law is presumed to be the same as sister-state law, see id. at 405 n. 10 (citing
Etheridge v. Sullivan, 245 S.W.2d 1015 (Tex. App. 1951)). See RESTATEMENT, supra note
133, at § 136 comment h, Reporters' Notes to comment h, for more discussion of these and
other presumptions in raising, pleading, and proving choice of law. Readers should note that
although the court may employee these presumptions when parties fail to raise a choice of law
question, the court is not required to do so. Thus the court appears to have the inherent power
to raise choice of law on its own motion.
285. 614 F. Supp. at 1338.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 1338-41.
289. 105 S. Ct. 2965, 86 L. Ed. 2d 628 (1985).
290. Id. at 2981, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 649.
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contacts to the claims asserted by each plaintiff class member" 291 in order to
apply its law to that claim. Pertinent concerns were fairness to the defend-
ant and the relative interests of other states, particularly Oklahoma and
Texas, where the liability or calculation of damages might be different. The
majority appropriately failed to indicate which state's law should apply to
each class member's claim, although the court did hint that the site of the
wells and the owners' residences are factors.292
Phillips is a good example of the distinction between legislative jurisdic-
tion and choice of law. The former requires that Kansas law have the mini-
mally appropriate connections for application to the lawsuit. The latter asks
which state's law, of all the states having legislative jurisdiction, is the most
appropriate to govern the merits of the lawsuit. Legislative jurisdiction rests
on the Constitution alone; choice of law turns on the forum state's choice of
law rule. The Supreme court is empowered only to decide the legislative
jurisdiction question (can Kansas law be applied to non-Kansas claims?),
and not the resulting choice of law questions (if not Kansas law to non-
Kansas claims, then what?).
The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in four choice of law
cases in 1985. Scott v. City of Hammond293 was an Illinois federal court
decision upholding the Supreme Court ruling in Illinois v. City of Milwau-
kee294 that federal common law supplanted state law regarding interstate
water pollution. The Seventh Circuit further held in Scott that the passage
of federal statutory law governing interstate water pollution295 did not sup-
plant the application of federal common law to appropriate issues in this
case. The court thus directed remand dismissal of Scott's complaint against
the City of Hammond on the grounds that the complaint was based upon
Illinois nuisance law inapplicable to this case. Scott petitioned for certiorari
arguing that in federal diversity claims such as this, the court should fashion
a federal common law choice of law rule instead of applying federal substan-
tive law derived from a variety of state substantive laws.296 Scott further
argued that if the Illinois federal court were required to apply Indiana law to
the merits of the case, then the Seventh Circuit should remand the case for
the federal district court to apply the Indiana choice of law rule, that is,
Scott argued for renvoi. 297 The United States Supreme Court declined
review.
Arlington County v. Biscoe298 was a negligence claim for an innocent by-
stander's injuries suffered in the District of Columbia when an Arlington
County, Virginia policeman continued a high speed chase into the District of
291. Id. at 2980, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 648 (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-
13 (1981)).
292. Id. at 2977-78, 86 L. Ed. 2d 645-46.
293. 731 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 980, 83 L. Ed. 2d 21 (1985).
294. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
295. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982).
296. See 53 U.S.L.W. 3161, 3161 (Sept. 11, 1984) for a synopsis of Scott's argument to the
Supreme Court.
297. Id. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 154, at § 8 for the standard view on renvoi.
298. 738 F.2d 1352 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 909, 83 L. Ed. 2d 923 (1985).
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Columbia. The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
trial court was not required to honor Virginia's grant of sovereign immunity
to Arlington County because of the forum's greater interest in having its law
govern. Arlington County thus answers the question reserved by the United
States Supreme Court in the similar Nevada v. Hall case. 299 The D.C. Cir-
cuit's answer was sufficiently proper that the Supreme Court denied
certiorari.
Finch v. Hughes Aircraft Co. 300 held that the Maryland court did not have
to honor the parties' choice of California law where Maryland law was iden-
tical. That is, in false conflicts cases the forum may apply its own law. 30 1 In
Park v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer/United Artists Corp.302 the Ninth Circuit
failed to apply the parties' choice of law in construing a film distributor's
general release in a licensing agreement. The distributor then unsuccessfully
sought Supreme Court review arguing that due process and equal protection
were violated when the parties' choice of law was ignored. 30 3
C. The Rule of Decision Statute
In its new Civil Practice and Remedies Code Texas has recodified and
reworded its Rule of Decision statute. The revised statute states: "The rule
of decision in this state consists of [(1)] those portions of the common law of
England that are not inconsistent with the constitution or the laws of this
state, [(2)] the constitution of this state, and [(3)] the laws of this state."'3 °4
The predecessor statute provided: "The common law of England, so far as it
is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of this State, shall together
with such Constitution and laws, be the rule of decision, and shall continue
in force until altered or repealed by the Legislature. '30 5
Rule of decision is a synonym for governing law and thus is a choice of
law statute. The statute is not the standard choice of law rule directing the
application of a foreign law to a particular case, but instead directs the inclu-
sion of non-forum law into the substantive law of Texas in appropriate cases.
Similar rule of decision provisions have been adopted by every state except
Louisiana, where civil law controls.30 6
A problem in the new Texas codification, inherited from the predecessor
Rule of Decision statute, is the ambiguous reference to the common law of
299. 440 U.S. 410 (1979). The question reserved in Nevada v. Hall is whether the forum
state is constitutionally free to apply forum law and ignore important law enforcement policies
of a neighboring state when the forum state's action will interfere with the other state's capac-
ity to fulfill its own sovereign responsibilities. Id. at 424 n.24.
300. 57 Md. App. 190, 469 A.2d 867 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1190, 84 L. Ed. 2d 336.
301. 469 A.2d at 887.
302. See the synopsis at 53 U.S.L.W. 3571, 3571 (Feb. 12, 1985) (unreported opinion), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 1192, 84 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1985).
303. Id.
304. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 5.001 (Vernon Pam. 1986).
305. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1 (Vernon 1969) (repealed).
306. See generally 15A AM. JUR. 2d Common Law §§ 13, 14 (1976).
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England as being applicable in Texas courts.307 Does this mean one can
argue current English common law if it is not inconsistent with Texas and
United States law? How does American common law apply in Texas? Is it
included in the term "common law of England"? Cases interpreting the old
Texas Rule of Decision statute made clear that common law means the Eng-
lish common law as received by the American colonies and subsequently
evolved here in the United States.308 No doubt most lawyers assume this
meaning when reading the statute. Nonetheless, as long as the legislature
has gone to the trouble to recodify and rephrase the Rule of Decision statute,
it should have provided a clearer definition for common law. For example,
simply dropping the reference to England would eliminate the ambiguity of
which period of English common law would apply, leaving a Texas adoption
of the common law including that received by the American British colonies
and its subsequent evolution in the United States. 30 9 Better yet, many states
provide a reference date when referring to English common law.310
III. FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
Foreign judgments create Texas conflicts of laws in two ways: the local
enforcement of non-Texas judgments, both of sister states and foreign coun-
tries, and the preclusion effect of foreign lawsuits on local lawsuits. The
1985 Survey period offered significant developments in the judgment en-
forcement area, and less significant but illustrative preclusion developments.
A. Enforcement
Foreign judgments include sister state and foreign country judgments, but
not federal court judgments from other states, because courts summarily en-
force those judgments as local federal court judgments. 311 Two methods of
enforcing foreign judgments are available in Texas: the common law
method of using the foreign judgment as the basis of a local lawsuit, and the
more direct procedure under the uniform foreign judgment acts.
1. The Foreign Judgments Acts. Since 1981 Texas has used two uniform
307. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 250 (5th ed. 1979) for the variety of definitions for
common law.
308. Tejas Dev. Co. v. McGough Bros., 165 F.2d 276, 279 (5th Cir. 1948); Grigsby v. Reib,
105 Tex. 597, 600, 153 S.W. 1124, 1125 (1913).
309. For examples of statutes referring only to common law see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-3
(1984) (no reference to England); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2 (West 1960) (common law as
recognized in the United States).
310. See PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 1503 (Purdon Pam. Supp. 1985) (incorporating
English common law as it existed on May 14, 1776); Wis. CONST. art. XIV, § 13 (incorporat-
ing common law, omitting the "English" prefix, as of the date of the Wisconsin constitution's
adoption). The most accepted reference date for English common law is "the fourth year of
the reign of James the First," which ran from March 24, 1606, to March 23, 1607. See, e.g.,
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 1-101 (1976) (adopts English common law prior to fourth year of James
the First); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1, § 801 (Smith-Hurd 1980) (adds other specific English com-
mon law periods identified by the reigning English monarch); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 1.010
(Vernon 1969) (uses fourth year of James the First's reign as reference point).
311. See 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (1982) (judgment must be registered).
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acts for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, although
their adoption did not displace the common law enforcement method. 312
The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act 313 (UEFJA) provides
for Texas enforcement of non-Texas judgments that are entitled to full faith
and credit. 314 This includes sister-state judgments as well as foreign country
judgments that have Texas recognition under the second uniform act, the
Uniform Foreign Country Money Judgment Recognition Act
(UFCMJRA).315
Both acts were recodified in 1985 and incorporated into the new Civil
Practice and Remedies Code. 316 The UEFJA, formerly article 2328b-5, now
comprises sections 35.001 through 35.008 of the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code. The only substantive change in the text is the deletion of
former section 7, entitled "Uniformity of Interpretation" that stated "[t]his
Act shall be interpreted and construed to achieve its general purpose to
make the law of those states which enact it uniform. '317 Nonsubstantive
changes include minor rearrangement of the text.
The UFCMJRA's former article 2328b-6 is now sections 36.001 through
36.008 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. 318 As with the
UEFJA, the only substantive change is the deletion of former section 9 enti-
tled "Uniformity of Interpretation" and worded much the same as its coun-
terpart in the UEFJA. 319  The text is similarly rearranged. The
rearrangement and deletions in the two uniform acts by the new Civil Prac-
tice and Remedies Code are for recodification only, with no intended sub-
stantive changes. 320 The new Code went into effect on September 1, 1985.
The Survey period produced three noteworthy cases that focused on these
acts. Two related cases, Merritt v. Harless321 and Brosseau v. Harless,322
involved distinct mandamus actions against a Texas district court judge by
opposing litigants Merritt and Brosseau. The entire dispute comprises six
separate legal actions excluding appeals. 323
312. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 35.008 (Vernon Pam. 1986) (former
article 2328b-5, § 6).
313. Id. §§ 35.001-.008 (former article 2328b-5).
314. Id. § 35.001 (former article 2328b-5, § 1).
315. Id. §§ 36.001-.008 (former article 2328b-6).
316. Act of June 16, 1985, ch. 959, § 1, 1985 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 7043 (Vernon).
317. Act of May 25, 1981, ch. 195, § 7, 1981 Tex. Gen. Laws 464, 465, repealed by Act of
June 16, 1985, ch. 959, § 9, 1985 Tex. Sess. Law. Serv. 7043, 7218 (Vernon).
318. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 36.001-.008 (Vernon Pam. 1986).
319. "This Act shall be construed to carry out its general purpose to make uniform the law
of those states that enact it." Act of June 17, 1981, ch. 808, § 9, 1981 Tex. Gen. Laws 3069,
3071, repealed by Act of June 16, 1985, ch. 959, § 9, 1985 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 7043, 7218
(Vernon).
320. Act of June 16, 1985, ch. 959, § 10, 1985 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 7043, 7219 (Vernon)
(quoted in the "Enactment" preface to TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. (Vernon Pam.
1986)).
321. 685 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
322. 697 S.W.2d 56 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ).
323. The six legal actions were: (1) Argos Resources, Inc. 1981-1 Partnership v. Merritt,
No. 82-13602-F (116th Jud. Dist., Dallas County, Tex. filed Nov. 5, 1982); (2) Merritt v.
Brosseau, No. 82-20717 (11 th Jud. Cir. Ct., Fla. filed Nov. 5, 1982); (3) Merritt v. Brosseau
No. 84-6317-F (116th Jud. Dist., Dallas County, Tex. filed May 15, 1984) (Merritt's Florida
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Merritt, a Florida resident, entered into a partnership agreement with
Texas resident Brosseau that included Merritt's purchase of $100,000 in un-
registered securities from Brosseau and his business alter egos. The partner-
ship fell out, resulting in simultaneous lawsuits in Florida and Texas filed on
November 5, 1982. Merritt sued Brosseau in a Florida state court for recis-
sion of Merritt's $100,000 securities purchase and other relief. Brosseau
sued Merritt in a Texas state court for a declaratory judgment, claiming
fraud and misrepresentation. Brosseau filed his Texas action in Judge Fred
Harless's court, which led to the two actions against respondent Harless.
On October 12, 1983 Judge Harless stayed Brosseau's Texas action in def-
erence to Merritt's Florida litigation, in which Brosseau had already entered
a general appearance. In the Florida action Brosseau contested jurisdiction
and service of process and attempted several other procedural remedies. All
of them failed and Brosseau then appealed personal jurisdiction. After the
Florida Supreme Court denied review of Brosseau's jurisdictional challenge,
the Florida trial court issued a summary final judgment against Brosseau,
granting Merritt damages and interest of $135,432.25. Brosseau appealed in
Florida and unsuccessfully requested that the Florida trial court stay judg-
ment. When the Florida trial court refused, the Florida judgment became
final and enforceable, which made it enforceable in Texas under the
UEFJA.
3 2 4
Merritt filed his final Florida damages judgement (FJ-1) in Texas state
court under the UEFJA. The Texas court in which Merritt filed initially
granted his request for enforcement. While enforcement was pending, how-
ever, FJ- 1 was transferred to Judge Harless's court because of Harless's con-
trol of the stayed Brosseau action against Merritt. 32 5 Harless rescinded the
FJ- 1 enforcement order and replaced it with a stay of execution. At this
point, a second Florida judgement was entered against Brosseau for attorney
fees in FJ-1. The Florida attorney fees judgment (FJ-2) was also filed in
Harless's court.326 Merritt contested Harless's stay of FJ-1 by filing a man-
damus action against Harless in the Dallas Court of Appeals. Brosseau re-
sponded that the Texas court lacked mandamus jurisdiction in this case, that
Judge Harless had stayed within his discretion in staying the Florida judg-
ment, and that the UEFJA authorized Harless's stay.3 2 7
The Dallas Court of Appeals disagreed with all of Brosseau's arguments,
judgment in No. 82-20717); (4) Merritt v. Brosseau, No. 85-1648-J (191st Jud. Dist., Dallas
County, Tex. filed Feb. 5, 1985) (Merritt's attorney fee judgment in No. 82-20717); (5) Merritt
v. Harless, 685 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ); (6) Brosseau v. Harless, 697
S.W.2d 56 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ). Although UEFJA actions are often no more
than administrative actions involving clerical registration without litigation, in this instance
the UEFJA actions (numbers 3 & 4 above) were actual litigation.
324. That is, finality is a prerequisite to UEFJA enforcement. The final judgment must
satisfy the remaining UEFJA criteria as well.
325. 685 S.W.2d at 709-10.
326. See supra note 323.
327. 685 S.W.2d at 710. Brosseau was evidently referring to both grounds for stay under
the former article 2328b-5, § 4(a) & (b), since his basis for stay was a Florida appeal (§ 4(a))
and other defenses (§ 4(b)).
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holding that (1) it did have mandamus jurisdiction in UEFJA cases, 328
(2) Brosseau's personal jurisdiction in Florida could not be relitigated in
Merritt's Texas UEFJA action because litigation on the merits had already
occurred and gone to final judgment in Florida,329 and (3) Brosseau could
not raise again in a UEFJA action the other procedural remedies that failed
in Florida.330 The Dallas court noted that it lacked precedent for this opin-
ion because the UEFJA was new in Texas, but nonetheless applied its own
interpretation and construction of the UEFJA. That interpretation and con-
struction held that Texas courts will give sister-state judgments the same
effect as if they were rendered in Texas, and that Harless therefore lacked
authority to stay FJ-1.
Upon returning to Judge Harless's trial court, Brosseau sought to block
the enforcement of FJ-1 by asking Judge Harless to stay FJ-1 execution be-
cause of a possible set-off in his unprosecuted claims against Merritt in the
stayed Texas action. Brosseau also filed a motion seeking a retrial of FJ-2 in
Harless's court and requesting that Judge Harless enjoin the sale of Bros-
seau's property to satisfy FJ-2. Harless denied all of Brosseau's requests,
leading to Brosseau's mandamus action against Harless. 331 In the manda-
mus action Brosseau asked the Dallas court to order Judge Harless to grant
the relief just denied him. Brosseau argued that Judge Harless lacked au-
thority to stay the original Texas action against Merritt, that Brosseau
should have a chance to litigate those claims against Merritt, and that the
court should stay the execution of FJ-1 and FJ-2 pending that litigation.332
The court of appeals agreed with Brosseau, but only in part. The court
decided that Judge Harless should determine the amount of damages in
Brosseau's untried counterclaims against Merritt, and stay enforcement of
FJ-1 as to that amount only. 3 3 3 As to Merritt's FJ-2 judgment for Florida
attorney fees, the court noted that FJ-2 was final in Florida with no superse-
deas bond from Brosseau, and accordingly held that no grounds existed to
stay enforcement of FJ-2.334
In a perfect world the Merritt/Brosseau dispute would require one law-
suit, assuming that the perfect world had legal disputes. In a near-perfect
world with state boundaries, enforcement of the judgment in another forum
might require a second lawsuit, and a third lawsuit might result if each liti-
gant filed in his home forum. In a less-than-perfect world struggling with
the application of a new UEFJA statute, a judgment debtor might need a
mandamus action to correct quickly an erroneous trial court ruling before an
improper execution against assets occurred. But in the real world, it took six
lawsuits to resolve the Merritt/Brosseau dispute.3 3 5 That is not what the
328. Id.
329. Id. at 710-11.
330. Id. at 711.
331. 697 S.W.2d at 57-58.
332. Id. at 58.
333. Id. at 59.
334. Id.
335. See supra note 323.
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UEFJA drafters had in mind.
A second 1985 highlight for foreign judgment enforcement, Hennessy v.
Marshall,3 36 involved both the UEFJA and its companion, the Uniform For-
eign Country Money Judgment Recognition Act (UFCMJRA). This case
raises interesting questions about both uniform acts. How long after notice
does the debtor have to respond? Does due process require a pre-enforce-
ment hearing if the debtor does not respond?
Hennessy v. Marshall was a mandamus action seeking vacation of a trial
judge's discovery order in pursuit of enforcement of an English judgment.337
The plaintiffs filed the English default judgment with the District Clerk of
Dallas County. After filing and without a hearing, Judge Marshall signed an
order stating that the judgment met the requirements of the UEFJA and the
UFCMJRA, concluding that the UFCMJRA recognized the English judg-
ment, which was therefore enforceable under the UEFJA. 338 Judge Mar-
shall then issued an order for nonparties Hennessy and Hartfield to provide
post-judgment discovery in pursuit of the judgment debtor's assets.
Hennessy and Hatfield moved to quash their subpoenas. Judge Marshall
denied their motion, whereupon Hennessy and Hatfield filed a mandamus
action against the judge on the ground that under the UFCMJRA the Eng-
lish judgment was not valid absent a plenary hearing. The court of appeals
agreed with Hennessy and Hatfield, holding that a court cannot enforce a
foreign country money judgment until it is recognized under the UFCM-
JRA. 339 The court further held that recognition of a foreign country money
judgment requires compliance with UFCMJRA sections 5 and 6. 340 Sec-
tions 5 and 6 provide criteria for the judgment's jurisdiction, validity, public
policy conflicts, and other recognition factors. Some factors are affirmative
defenses that the judgment debtor must raise, and others are elements that
the judgment creditor must establish regardless of the judgment debtor's re-
sponses. 34 1 Both the debtor's affirmative defenses and the creditor's burden
of recognition require a plenary hearing.342 If the foreign judgment is
proven recognizable, then enforcement is appropriate under the UEFJA.
Because no plenary hearing occurred in this case, the court held that the
English judgment was neither recognizable under the UFCMJRA nor en-
forceable under the UEFJA.343 The court therefore invalidated Judge Mar-
336. 682 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
337. No further information was given on the English lawsuit or the judgment debtor, but
we can infer that he has assets in Texas.
338. 682 S.W.2d at 342.
339. Id. at 343 (referring to former article 2328b-6, § 4, now TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 36.004 (Vernon Pam. 1986)).
340. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 36.005-.006 (Vernon Pam. 1986).
341. 682 S.W.2d at 344. The court did not distinguish the affirmative defenses from the
elements to be proven by the judgment creditor, although it did state that all defenses in § 5(b)
are affirmative defenses. Id.
342. That is, the elements to be proven by the judgment creditor cannot be assumed in his
pleadings or in the existence of the foreign judgment, but must be proven in court. Similarly,
the debtor's affirmative defenses require notice and an opportunity to present these defenses.
Id.
343. Id. at 344-45.
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shall's discovery order.34 4
In addition to requiring a plenary hearing, the Hennessy court held that
subpoenaed nonparties have standing to contest enforcement proceedings. 345
If Hennessy is correct that a plenary hearing is necessary for foreign country
judgments, do sister-state judgments under the UEFJA also require such a
hearing? The answer is not clear. The advantage of a mandatory hearing
lies in its assurance of judgment validity on essential issues such as personal
and subject matter jurisdiction, as well as the opportunity for the judgment
debtor to raise affirmative defenses. Although the UEFJA does not ex-
pressly provide all the defenses to enforcement that are provided in the
UFCMJRA, 34 6 sections 35.001347 and 35.003348 do imply many of those de-
fenses. If these defenses require a plenary hearing for foreign country judg-
ments, why not for sister-state judgments? One might respond that full faith
and credit affords sister-state judgments a presumption of validity349 that
foreign country judgments do not automatically receive. The full faith and
credit doctrine, however, does not override due process 350 and, according to
Hennessy, the due process underlying a plenary hearing assures that execu-
tion of the judgment does not unfairly deprive the debtor of his assets.3 5
Thus we are left with two questions. First, does the UEFJA require a
plenary hearing? If not, does due process require a hearing? The answer to
both questions is unclear. The literal language of the UEFJA does not man-
date a hearing. The Act merely authorizes a hearing if the judgment debtor
requests a stay. 3 5 2 As to whether due process requires a hearing before en-
forcing a sister-state judgment under the UEFJA, no state has so required
and the United States Supreme Court has not yet considered the question. 353
344. Id. at 345.
345. Id. at 343. The court premised its conclusion on standing, based on the fact that
Hennessy and Hatfield had no viable alternative to resist answering the subpoena. Subpoenaed
parties in future UFCMJRA cases will presumably be in the same position to challenge the
judgment's validity.
346. The UFCMJRA itemizes its defenses to recognition in TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. §§ 36.001, .002, .005, .006, .007 (Vernon Pam. 1986). The UEFJA's only express
defense is id. § 35.006(a), allowing for stay of enforcement pending a foreign appeal.
347. This limits the UEFJA to foreign judgments entitled to full faith and credit.
348. This subjects foreign judgment filed under the UEFJA to the same defenses and pro-
ceedings as for unenforced Texas judgments.
349. See McFadden v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 689 S.W.2d 330, 332 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1985, no writ); see also R. LEFLAR, supra note 212, at 158 (courts indulge in assump-
tion that proceedings producing judgments are valid). It is possible to retain the presumption
of sister-state judgment validity under full faith and credit and still require a hearing. The
trend, however, is toward simple clerical registration of sister-state judgments.
350. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 154, at § 104.
351. 682 S.W.2d at 344.
352. The availability of a hearing is implied in TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 35.003 (Vernon Pam. 1986), which subjects foreign judgments to the same defenses and pro-
cedures as Texas judgments, and id. § 35.006, which provides for stay of enforcement pending
appeal. This is an issue that could require a hearing to prove the existence of the foreign
appeal.
353. Professor Weintraub has said that the United States Supreme Court has granted certi-
orari on this issue, but the cases have become moot prior to consideration by the court. Tele-
phone conversation with Professor Weintraub (January 22, 1986). But cf R. Leflar, supra note
212, at 155-58.
1986]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
Until this is resolved in Texas we can assume that the UFCMJRA will re-
quire a hearing, and that the UEFJA will not because of its literal language
and its presumption of sister-state judgment validity.
A further distinction between the UEFJA and the UFCMJRA is the
UEFJA's requirement of judgment security when staying enforcement; 354
this distinction reaffirms the UEFJA's underlying presumption of sister-state
judgment validity. The presumption of validity expedites the enforcement of
American judgments across state lines and thereby increases judicial effi-
ciency. On the other hand, this presumption may short circuit due process
by allowing judgment creditors to execute on assets before the judgment
debtor has had an opportunity to defend. By equating the enforcement of
out-of-state judgments with that of local judgments, the UEFJA assumes
that the judgment debtor is equally prepared to defend against both. Prepa-
ration against enforcement of a local judgment, however, is more likely than
preparation against enforcement of a sister-state judgment whose existence
may surprise the debtor.
Other problems with the UEFJA remain. After a judgment creditor files a
foreign judgment in Texas under the UEFJA and the debtor receives notice,
how long does the debtor have to request a stay? The UEFJA fails to ad-
dress this crucial point. Due process requires a reasonable time before en-
forcement, but how much time is reasonable for a foreign judgment that may
surprise the debtor? The UEFJA provides that a court may enforce a valid
foreign judgment after filing and notice the same as a Texas judgment.3 5
Does this mean that the debtor would have no more time to resist enforce-
ment than for a locally-rendered judgment? Clearly the debtor should have
more time for a foreign judgment because of the possible surprise factor and
the time needed to retain local counsel. The answers to these questions are
important both to debtors with valid defenses and to creditors who might
face undue enforcement delays from overcompensating courts. If the
UEFJA is to fulfill its purpose of facilitating foreign judgment enforcement,
it should specify the response time.
Another UEFJA ambiguity is the Texas court's method of endorsing the
foreign judgment. Does the court issue its own order incorporating the for-
eign judgment or merely endorse the foreign document? This is a relatively
minor problem that will rarely affect the outcome, but it could delay enforce-
ment and in some instances allow the debtor to dispose of assets before a
freeze order could issue.
2. Common Law Enforcement
Before the adoption of the uniform acts in Texas, judgment creditors en-
forced foreign judgments by the common law method of using the foreign
judgment as the basis for a new action in Texas. The UEFJA specifically
354. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 35.006(b) (Vernon Pam. 1986) (former arti-
cle 2328b-5, § 4(b)).
355. Id. § 35.003 (former article 2328b-5, § 2).
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preserves the common law method as an alternative, and four Survey period
cases reflect that alternative. 356 The underlying mandate for common law
enforcement is the full faith and credit clause of the United States
Constitution. 357
The first case is paired with a companion case filed under the UEFJA.
McFadden v. Farmers and Merchants Bank 358 and Weakley v. Chandlers
Furniture Co. 359 are California default judgments against Barney and Carol
Weakley (formerly Carol McFadden). In McFadden the California bank
took a default judgment against Carol McFadden, then filed a common law
enforcement action in Texas where McFadden defaulted again. Execution
issued, and McFadden made her first appearance with a motion to quash
execution for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the California court and
invalidity of the California judgment for lack of a judge's signature. The
Texas trial court rejected McFadden's motion to quash, and she sued for
mandamus in the court of appeals where she lost again. The court of appeals
held that the California court had subject matter jurisdiction to render the
judgment in spite of being a mere municipal court.360 McFadden argued
that unpleaded foreign law is presumed to be the same as Texas law, and
that the court should therefore presume that the California municipal court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over collection actions, as do Texas munic-
ipal courts. The court of appeals rejected this argument by pointing out that
the full faith and credit clause presumed the validity of sister-state judg-
ments unless proven otherwise, and that only California law could disprove
the municipal court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction.36 1 Since McFadden
offered no proof of California law, the court presumed that a proper court
rendered the California judgment. McFadden also argued that the lack of a
judges signature voided the California judgment on its face. The court of
appeals rejected this argument, noting that McFadden's supporting case law
did not pertain because of all her cases concerned instances of non-signing
where the court heard the case on the merits, which did not happen with
McFadden's California judgment, and where the objection was a direct at-
tack on the case. 362 Collateral attacks363 on foreign judgments must prove
them void, not merely voidable. Foreign judgments, the court observed, can
be proven void on the gr6unds of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and lack
of personal jurisdiction; therefore, concluded the court, an unsigned judg-
356. Id. § 35.008 (former article 2328b-5, § 6).
357. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. The federal statutory implementation of full faith and credit
is 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982), which provides authentication requirements for sister-state judg-
ments and occasionally plays a determining role in these cases. See infra notes 369-70 and
accompanying text.
358. 689 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, no writ).
359. 689 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, no writ).
360. 689 S.W.2d at 332.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. A direct attack on a foreign judgment occurs when the foreign judgment is first liti-
gated for enforcement purposes in Texas or another enforcing state. McFadden defaulted on
the initial Texas enforcement action for the California judgment, and only challenged enforce-
ment at the execution phase, which is a collateral attack.
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ment is merely voidable as shown by the Texas cases relied upon by McFad-
den. 3 64 McFadden thus lost her late challenge to the California judgment, as
did Barney Weakley on identical grounds. 36 5
The second common law enforcement is similar to McFadden and
Weakley. Cal Growers, Inc. v. Palmer Warehouse and Transfer Co. 3 6 6
sought enforcement of a California default judgment. After filing suit in
Texas as a full faith and credit enforcement of a sister-state judgment, the
judgment debtor objected on the ground that a judge had not signed the
California judgment, and thus a California judge had not rendered or
adopted the decision. Instead, the California judgment was simply signed by
a California court clerk, who is authorized to enter default judgments under
section 585 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. 367 Judgment debtor
Palmer Warehouse moved for summary judgment against Texas enforce-
ment of the California judgment on the grounds noted above, and the trial
court agreed. Judgment creditor Cal Growers appealed, arguing that the
trial court should have taken judicial notice of California Code section 585
as required by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 184a.3 68 Cal Growers had so
moved in the trial court, and contended that it attached a copy of section
585 to its trial motion. The appellate record, however, had no copy of sec-
tion 585 with the trial motion, giving the appearance that Cal Growers had
not included one at trial. Palmer Warehouse argued that by failing to pro-
vide a copy of the California statute, Cal Growers failed to prove California
law and the motion was therefore insufficient to allow judicial notice of for-
eign law. A Houston court of appeals disagreed, holding that sufficient no-
tice for foreign law occurred if Cal Growers cited the statute and described
its substance. 369 The trial judge was thus required to take judicial notice of
section 585, which validated the California clerk-signed judgment.
Starzl v. Starz370 is the attempted Texas enforcement of a sister-state sup-
port order by an ex-wife. The ex-husband raised no objections to the filing
or the prosecution of the foreign support judgment, but did appeal the result-
ing Texas judgment on the ground that the ex-wife's foreign judgment
lacked proper authentication 37' and therefore did not deserve full faith and
credit. The ex-wife argued that the ex-husband waived this evidentiary ob-
364. 689 S.W.2d at 332.
365. 689 S.W.2d at 340-41. Weakley, unlike McFadden, was filed under the UEFJA in
1984. McFadden was brought to Texas in 1981, prior to the UEFJA's Texas implementation.
The cases are otherwise identical.
366. 687 S.W.2d 384 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ).
367. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 585 (West Supp. 1986).
368. TEX. R. Civ. P. 184a.
369. 687 S.W.2d at 386.
370. 686 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
371. Authentication criteria was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982), which is the statutory
implementation of the full faith and credit clause of the federal constitution. Section 1738
requires that a copy of a foreign judgment be certified by the official custodian from the render-
ing court, usually the court clerk, and that the rendering judge verifiy the custodian's certifica-
tion. The court of appeals also noted that failing to meet § 1738 authentication requirements
was not crucial if the foreign judgment met Texas authentication requirements under TEX.
REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 3731a (Vernon Supp. 1986). Petitioner also failed to meet art.
3731a requirements, which are substantially similar to § 1738. Note that art. 3731a has been
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jection by failing to raise it at trial. The Dallas Court of Appeals disagreed
and held for the ex-husband. The court noted that by not objecting to au-
thentication at trial, the ex-husband waived his right to exclude the foreign
judgment as hearsay evidence, but did not waive his right to an appellate
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on which the trial court based its
judgment. Accordingly, the court of appeals found that the improperly au-
thenticated foreign judgment provided insufficient evidence for enforcement
in Texas.
Fender v. Delta Mud & Drilling Co. 3 72 is the attempted enforcement of a
Louisiana default judgment. Fender, the judgment debtor, contested en-
forcement on the ground that plaintiff Delta had fraudulently told him that
it would not pursue the Louisiana action without further notice to him, that
Delta in fact got a default judgment without further notice to Fender, and
that his reliance on Delta's statements caused him to forgo his defense in
Louisiana. Delta argued that Fender had the burden of showing that Louisi-
ana permitted his fraud-in-procurement defense in attacking the default
judgment, and that absent such a showing the Texas court could not allow
the defense. Neither Fender nor Delta had come forward with the relevant
Louisiana law, causing the Texas trial court to grant summary judgment for
Delta. The Tyler Court of Appeals disagreed on three grounds. First, ab-
sent proof to the contrary, the Texas court would presume that Louisiana
law was the same as Texas law. 373 Because no one had proven relevant Lou-
isiana law, the court would presume that Louisiana would allow the defense
if Texas did.374 Second, Texas does allow Fender's defense that he had no
chance to defend the Louisiana action because of Delta's assurance that it
would not pursue the action without further notice to him.375  Finally,
Fender's fraud allegations raise a factual question which the Texas trial
court must determine on remand. 376
3. Child Custody Enforcement. Texas statutorily enforces sister-state child
custody awards under Texas Family Code sections 11.63 and 11.64(a). 37 7 In
addition, the federal mandate under full faith and credit is found in the Fed-
eral Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act (PKPA),37 8 a corrollary to the stat-
utory full faith and credit imperative. 37 9 The PKPA sets out both
jurisdictional and judgment enforcement standards for interstate child cus-
tody disputes.
Texas produced three notable custody enforcement cases in the 1985 Sur-
vey period. All are discussed at length in the judicial jurisdiction section and
repealed by TEX. R. EVID. 202, effective Sept. 1, 1983, to the extent that art. 3731a affects
court procedure. To the extent that art. 3731a is a substantive rule, it remains in effect.
372. 697 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1985, no writ).
373. Id. at 657.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id. at 658.
377. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 11.63, .64(a) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1986).
378. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982).
379. See supra notes 116-35 and accompanying text.
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briefly here. 380 Lundell v. Clawson381 is a Minnesota/Texas dispute in which
the Austin Court of Appeals held that the Minnesota resident father was
entitled to immediate habeas corpus custody because of his controling Min-
nesota custody award, but that the Texas resident mother could pursue her
Texas litigation if she could show that Minnesota had lost or declined juris-
diction under the PKPA.382 In Bolger v. Bolger383 the Corpus Christi Court
of Appeals held that it could not litigate child custody in the Texas father's
divorce action because New York, the children's home state, had accepted
jurisdiction in an action filed after the father's Texas action.384 Finally, in
Irving v. Irving385 the Fort Worth Court of Appeals gave full faith and credit
to an Illinois custody decree, thereby undercutting a Texas custody decree,
because Illinois was the children's home at the time of the Texas filing. 386
International custody disputes are governed by section 23 of the UCCJA,
which makes:
The provisions of [the UCCJA] relating to the recognition and enforce-
ment of custody decrees of other states apply to custody decrees and
decrees involving legal institutions similar in nature to custody institu-
tions rendered by appropriate authorities of other nations if reasonable
notice and opportunity to be heard were given to all affected persons. 387
No cases under this provision were decided in the 1985 Survey period. In-
ternational custody enforcement may soon be supplemented by the Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, com-
pleted in 1980, approved by the United States' Secretary of State Advisory
Committee, and submitted to the Senate where it awaits ratification. Can-
ada, France, Switzerland, and Portugal have ratified the proposal.
B. Preclusion by Res Judicata
The United States Constitution requires that Texas courts give full faith
and credit to the judicial proceedings of sister states.388 In addition to pro-
viding the basis for the enforcement of sister-state judgments in Texas, full
faith and credit also precludes legal issues or entire claims through res judi-
cata389 in subsequent Texas litigation in the same manner that Texas courts
would treat prior Texas judgments. Under stricter standards, preclusion is
extended to foreign country judgments according to the longstanding policy
380. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982).
381. 697 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, no writ). See supra notes 116-20 and ac-
companying text.
382. 697 S.W.2d at 841.
383. 678 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ). See supra note 121 and
accompanying text.
384. 678 S.W.2d at 196.
385. 682 S.W.2d 718 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, writ dism'd). See supra notes 132-34
and accompanying text.
386. 682 S.W.2d at 721.
387. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.73 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1986).
388. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
389. Res judicata includes claim preclusion (merger and bar) and issue preclusion (direct
and collateral estoppel).
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against repetitive litigation.390
The most interesting of this year's preclusion cases is Martin v. United
States Trust Co.,391 a twenty-four year old Texas lawsuit for the escheat of
an 1887 trust certificate worth over $2 million. The variety of factual and
legal issues are too lengthy to describe succinctly here, so this discussion will
therefore focus on a brief recital of Martin's conflict issue caused by an 1899
New York judgment purporting to establish title to the trust certificate. The
Dallas Court of Appeals held that the 1899 New York judgment was entitled
to full faith and credit in Texas, which might preclude, by collateral estop-
pel, relitigation of the certificate's ownership. 392 The court further held,
however, that the 1899 judgment would be given no greater collateral estop-
pel effect in Texas than it would have in New York.393 In New York, collat-
eral estoppel requires ashowing that (1) the party against whom collateral
estoppel is asserted was a party, or in privity with a party, to the prior ac-
tion, (2) the issue decided in the first action was identical to the issue in the
pending action, (3) the parties actually litigated the issue, (4) the opposing
party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the merits of the issue, and
(5) the issue was finally determined on the merits and was necessary, essen-
tial, and material to the outcome of the prior action.394 The Dallas court
found that although the parties were identical, the issues were not identical,
the decision was not final, and the precluded issue was not a necessary com-
ponent of the prior New York action. 395 Thus the 1899 New York decision
as to the certificate's owner had no effect on the 1985 Texas decision.
In a simpler collateral estoppel illustration, Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Shi-
nohara Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha,396 the Fifth Circuit held that a prior Califor-
nia consent decree did not warrant collateral estoppel or res judicata effect in
a subsequent Texas federal court action because the parties were not identi-
cal.397 The action involved a trademark infringement action by the makers
of Fuji photography products against the defendant manufacturer of print-
ing presses. Fuji Photo Film Company and one of Shinohara's distributors
approved the prior California consent decree. Since Shinohara was not a
party to the California action, the court held that collateral estoppel or res
judicata would apply only if Shinohara's distributor was in privity with, or
390. See generally SCOLES & HAY, supra note 198 at 916. The stricter Texas standards for
recognizing foreign country money judgments are set out in the Uniform Foreign Country
Money Judgments Recognition Act, TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 36.002, .005,
.006 (Vernon Pam. 1986). Although the UFCMJRA applies only to money judgments, its
standards for recognition are probably appropriate to all foreign country judgments vis-a-vis
their preclusion effect in Texas courts. For example, the UFCMJRA includes forum public
policy as non-recognition grounds. According to the RESTATEMENT, supra note 154, at §§ 98,
117, forum public policy is grounds for non-recognition of all foreign country judgments, for
enforcement or preclusion purposes.
391. 690 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref d n.r.e.).
392. Id. at 307.
393. Id. at 308.
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. 754 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1985).
397. Id. at 598-99.
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was the virtual representative of Shinohara.3 98 Although the Fifth Circuit
doubted the trial court finding that the distributor was not Shinohara's vir-
tual representative, it did not disturb that factual conclusion.399
Judgments from foreign countries may also have a precluding effect on
Texas lawsuits, as illustrated in the dicta and dissent of Gannon v. Payne.4°°
Gannon is a Texas sequel to Canadian litigation over proceeds from an oil
and gas partnership between Canadian Gannon and Texan Payne. Payne
had originally sued Gannon in Canada and prevailed on most claims in a
1979 ruling. In 1982 Payne again sued Gannon in Texas over the same dis-
pute, seeking the damages denied in the Canadian court and additional dam-
ages not requested earlier. Gannon answered and counterclaimed in the
Texas action, then filed a Canadian lawsuit seeking to thwart Texas jurisdic-
tion.40 1 Payne asked the Texas court to enjoin Gannon from pursuing the
Canadian litigation, and the Texas trial court complied. Appealing the
Texas injunction, Gannon argued that the 1979 Canadian judgment should,
by res judicata, preclude Payne's current Texas litigation, and that the court
should therefore deny the injunction against Gannon.
The Dallas court held that it could not consider the 1979 Canadian judg-
ment in Payne's injunctive motion aginst Gannon because the application of
res judicata is a decision on the merits of the Texas lawsuit, which is inap-
propriate when considering Payne's interlocutory injunctive relief.40 2 The
negative inference, of course, is that the Canadian judgment might be given
res judicata effect once the Texas case is considered on the merits. The dis-
sent foresaw the likelihood that the Canadian judgment would preclude
Payne's legal claims against Gannon, and argued that the court should deny
Payne injunctive relief because of the unlikelihood of his success on the mer-
its of the Texas case.40 3
IV. CONCLUSION
Judicial jurisdiction is in a state of flux, with continual redefining of the
constitutional aspects of personal jurisdiction. In dealing with the disparate
jurisdictional theories and their chimerical components, 4°4 Texas courts
raised compelling questions in 1985. Does a defendant's litigation conven-
ience represent a jurisdictional factor or merely a nonjurisdictional venue
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. 695 S.W.2d 741 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ granted). See supra notes 155-64 and
accompanying text for a fuller discussion of Gannon.
401. 695 S.W.2d at 743. The court of appeals decision did not explain how the Canadian
court could divest Texas of jurisdiction.
402. Id. at 744.
403. Id. at 749 (Akin, J., dissenting).
404. A chimera is a mythical monster made of a lion's head, a goat's body, and a serpent's
tail, all perfectly appropriate to our current standards for nonresident jurisdiction. A secon-
dary meaning for chimera is "an organism, especially a plant, containing tissues from at least
two genetically distinct parents," which is even more appropriate for the many distinct sources
supplying current jurisdictional theory. See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 234 (1969).
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matter? Is fairness a synonym for minimum contacts, or does due process
require a separate fairness test after a court has found minimum contacts?
In addition to these questions, 1985 reaffirmed the need to clarify the
scope of general and specific jurisdiction. Is the world divided into general
and specific jurisdiction? That is, are all cases either (1) based on the defend-
ant's case-related contacts with the forum (specific jurisdiction), or (2) based
on the defendant's general presence in the forum for lawsuits unrelated to
the defendant's forum activities (general jurisdiction)? This seems to cover
all instances of personal jurisdiction.4° 5 If so, where does stream of com-
merce jurisdiction fit in? Stream of commerce jurisdiction resembles specific
jurisdiction in that it specifically relates to injuries caused by the defendant's
product in the forum. But does specific jurisdiction require a defendant to
have committed an affirmative act aimed at the forum? If it does, then
stream of commerce jurisdiction less resembles specific jurisdiction, in that
stream of commerce jurisdiction can exist when a defendant has merely
turned his product over to a distributor with some foreseeability that it
would enter the forum state. In this example, the defendant's only affirma-
tive act is the manufacture of the product and its release to the distributor.
These seem to be activities that ought to require the more thorough contacts,
or presence, of general jurisdiction.
Questions about the interplay of stream of commerce jurisdiction with
general/specific jurisdiction are only a few of the many problems posed by
the current confusion in personal jurisdiction. This confusion will continue
to produce uneven precedents and erode the predictability of exposure to
distant litigation. We need a unified theory of personal jurisdiction. The
simplicity of a Pennoyer-like model is unlikely in today's complex social and
economic setting, but we can certainly improve upon the current morass of
jurisdictional paradigms.
Unlike the uncertain components of judicial jurisdiction, the components
of Texas choice of law are clearly spelled out in the most significant relation-
ship test in section 6 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. The
1985 Survey indicates that some Texas courts are using the section 6 factors
as solitary tests instead of the cumulative balancing factors they are meant to
be. The courts should analyze each choice of law problem in light of all
factors rather than picking the one factor that stands out or best fits the
desired conclusion.
The recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in Texas has been
simplified by the uniform acts, now in place for two years. Possible
problems arise, however, with the UEFJA's administrative recognition of
sister-state judgments without a preenforcement hearing, resulting in due
process problems where the local judgment debtor had no warning of the
foreign judgment's existence. The UEFJA's failure to specify the debtor's
time to request a stay of enforcement exacerbates this problem. Finally, this
year's holding that the UFCMJRA requires a hearing for recognition pro-
405. Status jurisdiction is one exception. See supra notes 124-31 and accompanying text.
See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 154, at §§ 69-79.
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tects the local judgment debtor from surprise enforcement of foreign country
money judgments.
